CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.470
16 June 1970
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTIETH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 16 June 1970, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

GE.70-12217
70-35446

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. A.F. DUMONT
	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Brazil:	Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. T. PETROV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
	Mr. R.E. MOORE
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. J. STRUCKA
	Mr. F. MARESKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
	Mr. G. ALEMU
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. J. PETRAN
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:	Mr. H. TANAKA
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
	Mr. T. SENGOKU
	Mr. J. SAKAMOTO
Mexico:	Mr. J. CASTANEDA
	Mr. B. SEPULVEDA
	Mr. R. VALERO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. B. DASHTSEREN
	Mr. Z. ERENDO
Morocco:	Mr. N. EL FASSI
	Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
Netherlands:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
	Mr. E. BOS
Nigeria:	Mr. SULE KOLO
	Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI
Pakistan:	Mr. K. AHMED
	Mr. S.A.D. BUKHARI
	Mr. T.O. HYDER
Poland:	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. I. VIRGIN
	Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
	Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
	Mr. Y.C. NAZARKINE
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. E.S. EL REEDY
	Mr. Y. RIZK
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
	Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD
	Mr. R. HOULISTON
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Netherlands): I declare open the 470th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. In accordance with established practice on the resumption of the work of the Conference, the first part of this meeting will be open.

3. Before we begin our deliberations I should like to take this opportunity, as Chairman of today's meeting, to welcome all of you, and especially Ambassador Petrov of Bulgaria and Ambassador Tanaka of Japan as new members of the Committee; although of course I realize that Ambassador Petrov is already well known to us in his former capacity of deputy leader of the Bulgarian delegation. I should also like to address a special word of welcome to Ambassador Castañeda of Mexico and Ambassador Erdembileg of Mongolia, who have returned to Geneva after a short absence. Finally, we are gratified that the representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Epstein, and the members of his staff are again with us at this session.

4. I should like to add to those words of welcome the expression of my sincere hopes and wishes that in the course of our resumed session we shall be able to make further progress on the important and complicated issues before this Committee. In the world of today we should do our utmost to meet the expectations of all mankind, and especially of the younger generations, to ensure that international co-operation and solidarity are no longer hampered by armed conflicts and confrontations, and that we strive towards peace and security among nations. May this Committee contribute to the fulfilment of those expectations!

5. I take it that, apart from a welcome amount of relaxation during our recess, we have all had an opportunity to reflect on the results of the first part of our session, to consult with our authorities and to consider what remains to be done during the current session. On the other hand, I do not think it is necessary for me to elaborate on the most urgent topics on our list. Suffice it to recall that we have a full agenda for the coming weeks. For instance, the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session requested this Committee to complete the text of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof (resolution 2602 F (XXIV); CCD/275). Another subject under consideration by this Committee relates to chemical and biological warfare. The General Assembly

(The Chairman, Netherlands)

has requested us to give urgent consideration to reaching agreement on the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and to report on the progress achieved on all aspects of that problem to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly (resolution 2603 B (XXIV), ibid.).

6. In connexion with the Disarmament Decade the Committee has also to pay further attention to the formulation of a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control (resolution 2602 E (XXIV), ibid.). The Committee has also been asked to continue its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests (resolution 2604 B (XXIV), ibid.) and to consider the achievement of a comprehensive test ban in the light of the results of the questionnaire addressed to governments by the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the provision of certain information in the context of a world-wide exchange of seismological data (resolution 2604 A (XXIV), ibid.).

7. I think that members of the Committee will agree with me that we should make every effort to achieve positive results in those fields, in particular with a view to the forthcoming celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, which, incidentally, coincides with the beginning of the Disarmament Decade; and in that connexion I should like to mention the recent statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations at a conference at United Nations Headquarters on "The politics of disarmament; proposals for the 1970s"[1/].

8. Since I have no speakers on my list for the open part of this meeting, that part is now concluded and I would request the press and visitors in the public gallery to withdraw. We shall have a five-minute recess, after which the Committee will resume its work in private.

The meeting was suspended at 3.15 p.m. and resumed at 3.20 p.m.

9. The CHAIRMAN (Netherlands): We now begin the closed part of our meeting, and I call upon the representative of the Soviet Union.

1/ Press Release SG/SM/1261, 22 May 1970.

10. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Before beginning our statement on the questions under discussion in the Committee on Disarmament, we wish to associate ourselves, Mr. Chairman, with the words of welcome you have addressed to the newly-appointed representatives to the Committee on Disarmament -- Ambassador Petrov, the representative of Bulgaria, and Ambassador Tanaka, the representative of Japan -- and to wish them success in their new assignment in the search for a solution to the problem of disarmament. We should also like to express our satisfaction at seeing among us again Ambassador Castañeda, the representative of Mexico; Ambassador Erdembileg, the representative of Mongolia, and Ambassador El Fassi, the representative of Morocco, who have resumed their participation in the work of our Committee. We have always valued highly their collaboration on the problems before the Committee.

11. I should now like to discuss the questions under consideration in this Committee. Today the Committee on Disarmament has again taken up the problems on its agenda. As at its spring session, the Committee has before it such problems as the conclusion of a treaty on prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and agreement on a draft convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles. It has also to consider the problems relating to general and complete disarmament, the question of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, and a number of other matters which have been introduced by various countries. In the present highly tense international situation there is urgent need to increase efforts to solve disarmament problems and to ensure international security.

12. With respect to prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, we believe that the Committee should conclude consideration of the draft treaty which was submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States on 23 April this year (CCD/269/Rev.2). The draft takes into account the opinions and comments of many States, presented both in this Committee and at the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Thus the draft treaty submitted for the consideration of the Committee is the product of the joint efforts of many countries and constitutes a kind of synthesis of the different positions and points of view of many States.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

13. In its statement to the Committee on 23 April this year (CCD/PV.467), the Soviet delegation gave a detailed account of the changes made in the text of the draft treaty. As we pointed out, the most important changes are in article III, concerning control. A number of new provisions have been added to those on verification and consultation rights: the right of a State Party to undertake verification, not only with its own means but also with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party; the possibility of referring a matter to the Security Council; the conduct of inspections; and reaffirmation of the requirement that all verification activities shall be conducted with due regard for the sovereign or exclusive rights of a coastal State with respect to the natural resources of its continental shelf under international law.

14. On the proposal of various countries, several new provisions have been inserted in the draft treaty. Thus, the zone covered by the draft treaty has been made more specific by the inclusion in article I of a provision which excludes the possibility of the emplacement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in the zone between the outer limit of the twelve-mile zone and the limit of the territorial waters of other States if their territorial waters are narrower than twelve miles. At different stages in the consideration of the draft articles were inserted concerning amendments, a conference for the revision of the treaty, a statement that the provisions of the treaty do not affect the obligations assumed by States Parties under international treaties establishing zones free from nuclear weapons, and also other changes. Additions were made to the preamble to the treaty.

15. Both the basic text of the draft treaty and the amendments and additions to it were discussed at the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1969 and at its spring session this year, and in the First Committee at the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Thus the draft treaty in its present form takes into account the views expressed on it. We hope that the States members of the Committee, having had an opportunity to study carefully and reflect upon this draft, share our view and that work on the treaty will shortly be concluded. That would enable us to devote more attention to other disarmament issues. To drag out our work on the treaty would not favour agreement. It could only complicate our further efforts to limit the sea-bed arms race. Agreement on this issue might

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

then be indefinitely postponed. We fear that any delay in this matter might have an unfavourable effect on further progress towards disarmament.

16. Another important and urgent task facing the Committee is agreement on a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. This question was discussed in detail at the Committee's spring session. The most significant feature of that debate was that the Committee advanced from general discussion of the problem to an analysis of the practical issues raised by the conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare. The discussion revealed that the views of members of the Committee coincided on a number of important points concerning the total prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The main point of agreement was the recognition by members of the Committee of the urgent need for such prohibition. Most delegations were in favour of embodying this prohibition in a single agreement covering both bacteriological and chemical methods of warfare.

17. The Committee has before it the proposal, submitted by nine socialist countries, for a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655). In our opinion the content of the draft and the extent of the prohibition it provides for — that is, the simultaneous prohibition of the production and stockpiling of chemical and of bacteriological methods of warfare — are in accordance with the emerging consensus of opinion in the Committee concerning the direction of our future efforts. On the proposal of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland the draft convention proposed by the socialist countries was supplemented in April of this year by provisions which strengthen the guarantees of its observance by the parties (CCD/285 and Corr.1). That constructive step was taken by the socialist countries to meet the position set forth by some delegations in the Committee and to ensure agreement on the convention as soon as possible.

18. Delay in the preparation of an agreement totally excluding chemical and bacteriological weapons from the military arsenals of States would at present serve only the interests of those trying to retain those means of warfare and to use them in military operations. It might encourage certain countries to expand the production of such means of warfare and lead to the development of newer and even

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

more dangerous forms of chemical and bacteriological weapons. All this should spur us to try to conclude our work on a draft convention on the total prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons as speedily as possible.

19. In addition to seeking agreement on partial disarmament measures such as the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the total prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the Committee must make an all-out effort to achieve the principal purpose for which it was established — general and complete disarmament. The need to find a fundamental solution to the problem of disarmament is especially urgent now that the scientific and technological revolution has radically transformed warfare and some States have acquired weapons of unprecedented destructive power. The rapid improvement and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction is fraught with consequences of great danger to mankind, carrying with them the threat of thermonuclear catastrophe.

20. It is obvious, moreover, that the arms race diverts much manpower and precious material resources from constructive uses. As this Committee has more than once been told, the countries of the world together spend $200,000 million annually for military purposes. No wonder, then that the people are more and more insistently demanding an end to the dangerous and wasteful arms race. Their desire for disarmament is also evident from the General Assembly's decisions on general and complete disarmament and from the statements made by the representatives of many States at the sessions of the General Assembly, in the Committee on Disarmament and at other international conferences and meetings.

21. The Soviet Union is prepared to engage in businesslike and specific discussions with a view to preparing and concluding a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and calls upon all countries, especially the nuclear Powers, to do the same. The Soviet Union is proposing the immediate resumption of discussions on general and complete disarmament because it believes that the negotiation of agreements on certain disarmament measures has accumulated useful experience and the necessary organizational machinery for negotiations on disarmament proper. The work already done on the preparation of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament has produced some results, which could serve as a starting-point for further efforts in that direction. As we have repeatedly emphasized, the Soviet Union certainly does not propose that the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

should be confined to the problems I have mentioned. As in the past, we are prepared to contribute to the solution of other disarmament problems and to do everything possible to advance the common cause of disarmament.

22. I should like to say in conclusion that the Soviet delegation will spare no effort to ensure that the work of the present session of the Committee on Disarmament is effective and that the Committee contributes to the solution of the disarmament problem and to the strengthening of international security.

23. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, may I first join you in the welcome extended to the representatives who are today heading their delegations for the first time: Ambassador Petrov and Ambassador Tanaka; and also welcome back the three representatives who have been with us before and are now rejoining us at this session: Ambassador Castañeda, Ambassador El Fassi and Ambassador Erdembileg?

24. As our Conference renews its work today after a six-week recess I think it is appropriate to quote a statement by President Nixon in his report on United States foreign policy for the 1970s. In that report he said:

> "... there is no greater idealism, no higher adventure than taking a realistic road to peace. It is an adventure realized, not in the exhilaration of a single moment, but in the lasting rewards of patient, detailed and specific efforts -- a step at a time."

It is through such detailed efforts that this Committee, by formulating effective arms control and disarmament agreements, can play an important role in helping to build the framework for a durable peace. In this light I want to comment briefly on the specific steps we might take here this summer and on the approach of the United States delegation to these matters.

25. On 23 April the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty, revised for the second time as a result of our discussions (CCD/269/Rev.2), to ban the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. I hope that during our recess all governments represented here have had an opportunity to study that revised draft. We look forward to hearing their comments on it.

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

26. When the Secretary-General of the United Nations spoke to us in this Committee on 18 February he pointed out that the elaboration and submission to the General Assembly of an agreed sea-bed treaty would be an important step in preventing the danger of the spread of a nuclear arms race to a vast area of our planet (CCD/PV.450, para. 16). This, indeed, is the central purpose of the treaty. It is the purpose that the United States has had very much in mind throughout these negotiations, because we believe that, as President Nixon said in his policy report: "the spread of weapons of mass destruction to this new realm would complicate the security problem of all nations and would be to no nation's advantage."

27. During our discussions this summer let us aim above all at the achievement of our main objective -- to ensure that the prohibition embodied in this draft will become a widely-accepted international treaty commitment with binding force. If that objective is kept in mind we should be able to transmit to the General Assembly a draft treaty that has broad support in this Committee.

28. During our spring session extensive and probing debate took place regarding the question of restraints on the development and production of chemical and biological weapons. We remain convinced that the best possibility for early and significant progress in this area lies in the negotiation of a ban on the production, stockpiling and use of biological weapons. We have described in considerable detail the threats posed to all by biological weapons and the reasons why we believe that progress on banning those weapons is feasible and desirable at this time. We hope that during the summer recess members of the Committee have considered the proposal by the United States (CCD/PV.468, para. 13) to broaden the coverage of the United Kingdom draft convention (ENDC/255/Rev.1) to include toxins. Coverage of these particularly deadly agents will broaden the significance and the impact of the convention on biological warfare.

29. The discussions in the Committee this spring, we believe, helped us to gain a clearer picture of the problems involved in attempting to elaborate a simultaneous and comprehensive ban on both chemical and biological weapons. In its interventions the United States delegation discussed the special problems posed by chemical agents. In the weeks ahead we plan to share with the Committee further results of our research in this area in the hope that these data will contribute to a fuller understanding of the problems of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

30. As I mentioned at the conclusion of the spring session (CCD/PV.469, para. 71), we will have before us this summer the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament (2602 E (XXIV); CCD/275). We hope our discussions on this topic will help in our search for promising and practical approaches in the field of arms control and disarmament. The United States delegation has devoted considerable study to this question during the recess, and we will outline our thoughts in this area in a plenary statement early in the session.

31. In taking the floor today I have touched on a few of the major issues that the Committee will have for consideration this session. There are other important items already on our agenda or referred to us by the United Nations General Assembly, such as the comprehensive test ban and the cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons; and I am sure that a number of delegations will have important proposals for us to consider this summer. If we are to give all of these issues the careful attention and study that they deserve, and at the same time to complete our work in advance of the twenty-fifth anniversary session of the United Nations General Assembly, we will have to proceed with a clear perception of our priorities and purposes. For its part, the United States delegation looks forward to working closely with our colleagues around this table in the common effort to make this session a fruitful one.

32. The CHAIRMAN (Netherlands): I wish to read out the following announcement on behalf of the two co-Chairmen:

> "The co-Chairmen are of the view that the Committee should follow the same procedures as at the last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Formal plenary meetings will normally be held at 10.30 a.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Additional formal meetings may be arranged on Wednesdays if any members desire to speak on that day. If any delegation wishes to call an informal Wednesday meeting, the co-Chairmen would appreciate being notified a reasonable time in advance."

I assume that this procedure proposed by the co-Chairmen, which has been followed in the past, will be acceptable to the members of the Committee; and unless I hear anything to the contrary I shall take it that it is approved.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 470th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Henri F. Eschauzier, representative of the Netherlands.

"A statement was made by the Chairman.

"After the conclusion of the open part of the meeting, statements were made by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

"The following document was circulated: Letter dated 10 June 1970 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the co-Chairmen of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting General Assembly documents A/7967/Add.2 and A/7967/Add.3 (CCD/284/Add.2).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 18 June 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 3.45 p.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.471
18 June 1970
ENGLISH

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held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 18 June 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. SULE KOLO (Nigeria)

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	Mr. N. GHILIE
	Mrs. F. DINU
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. I. VIRGIN
	Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
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United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
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	Mr. L.W. BOYES
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the 471st plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Before calling upon the first speaker on my list I wish to draw attention to a statement made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Protocol (SG/SM/1282). Members of the Committee may find that statement interesting, and copies have been circulated.

3. Mr. ZYBYLSKI (Poland): At the outset may I, on behalf of the Polish delegation, welcome the new leader of the Bulgarian delegation, Ambassador Petrov, the new leader of the Mongolian delegation, Ambassador Erdembileg, and the new leader of the Japanese delegation, Ambassador Tanaka? Wishing them all possible success in the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to this Committee, I should like to assure them of the sincere co-operation of the Polish delegation in the achievement of that aim.

4. In its statement today the Polish delegation wishes to concentrate on the latest revised text of the joint draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, presented by the co-Chairmen on 23 April (CCD/269/Rev.2). I should like to congratulate the co-Chairmen on the timely presentation of that document, which allowed every delegation to study it in depth during the recess and to present the opinion of its Government in a relatively short time. It is the sincere wish and hope of my delegation that the Committee will soon reach agreement on a widely-acceptable text which could be submitted on behalf of the Committee on Disarmament to the next session of the General Assembly. We are hopeful of such a result, fully aware as we are of the fact that the text now before us is the result of extensive negotiations in which, in one way or another, almost every member of this Committee participated. We are indeed aware that careful scrutiny was made of the criticisms and comments made here at the end of last year's session and at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

5. As is well known, the Polish delegation is playing an active role in the Committee's debates concerning the problem of reserving the sea-bed and the ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes. It might also be recalled that

(Mr. Zybylski, Poland)

Poland was the first country to advocate the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in a populated area (ENDC/C.1/1). It will therefore be understood that my country attaches special importance to any international action leading to the creation of additional areas where nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction will be prohibited. The elimination of weapons of mass destruction from military arsenals has been and remains one of the principal goals of my Government's foreign policy.

6. In the view of the Polish delegation the signing and coming into force of a treaty banning the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is of unusual importance; the sooner we reach agreement on this question the better. Through such a treaty mankind will be given an invaluable guarantee against the extension of the arms race in weapons of mass destruction to a geographical area where the installation of such devices would be extremely dangerous. We are gratified to note that in its article I the draft treaty prohibits the setting-up of structures and launching installations designed for nuclear missiles as well as conventional arms. It might be remembered that the Polish delegation drew the attention of this Committee to that question at the very outset of our discussion (ENDC/PV.399, para. 66).

7. The renunciation of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the ocean floor will no doubt promote the utilization of that vast part of the globe exclusively for peaceful purposes and the exploitation of its resources in the interest of mankind, having in mind first of all the interests of the developing countries. The early entry into force of the treaty before us would certainly act as an impetus to a prompt solution of the difficult problems faced by the Committee on the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

8. Of course Poland, as a strong supporter of the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed, considers the draft treaty before us as a first step in that direction. Although the draft does not give us full satisfaction we note, with some hope, that its preamble expresses the prospective signatories' determination to continue negotiations concerning further measures leading to the exclusion of the sea-bed and the ocean floor from the arms race. We regret that the co-Chairmen have not

(Mr. Zybylski, Poland)

found it possible to include in the draft the provisions contained in the Swedish paper (CCD/271). Understanding the need for a solution based on carefully-negotiated compromises, my delegation will not oppose the present wording of this preambular paragraph.

9. At the same time we would urge this Committee to keep on its agenda the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor as formulated in the 1968 report to the General Assembly when a programme of work (ENDC/236, p.3) for this Committee was established after the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*). In that way members of the Committee may raise the question of further steps leading to the demilitarization of this important area whenever they see that a question is ripe for discussion, without waiting for the review conference as provided for in article VI of the draft before us. In this particular case we believe that what are generally called "conventional" armaments can be dealt with in a separate document.

10. I should now like to turn to the question of verification. During our discussion of the draft submitted by the co-Chairmen on 7 October (CCD/269) and the revised draft presented to this Committee shortly before it adjourned on 30 October (CCD/269/Rev.1), as well as during the debate in the First Committee of the General Assembly, most of the criticism was directed towards the question of verification. It is understood that for every government acceding to a treaty dealing with disarmament or other preventive measures in this field, the question of verification becomes a very important issue. As has been indicated in our previous statements on this question, our primary consideration in this regard is that the system of verification should be compatible with the character and scope of the obligation to be assumed under the treaty and should also correspond to the geographical area of application of this agreement, while taking fully into account the norms of international law.

11. As an example of that policy we may say that we shared the view that there was no need for verification machinery in the Moscow Treaty on the partial test ban (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and in the outer-space Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI)). We were among those who advocated strict international control and efficient international machinery for the implementation of the non-proliferation

(Mr. Zybylski, Poland)

Treaty; and it is also well known that Poland took the initiative in proposing (CCD/285 and Corr.1) a system of complaints to the Security Council as a realistic safeguard against possible breach of a complete ban on chemical and bacteriological means of warfare.

12. So far as the sea-bed treaty is concerned, the criticism of the provisions for verification contained in the previous drafts was concentrated on two principal issues: first the request to spell out more specifically the coastal States' exclusive right of exploration and exploitation of their respective continental shelves and to affirm the right of the coastal State to consent to or participate in any verification procedure which may take place on its continental shelf; and second, the request for the establishment of international machinery for verification as a result of the fact that the immense majority of countries possessing sea coasts are not technologically or financially in a position to verify by themselves any violation or presumed violation of the treaty.

13. In the view of the Polish delegation the first of those points has been adequately taken care of in the new draft submitted to us on 23 April. This fact reflects the desire of all those who contributed to the final draft, whether directly or indirectly through consultation, to contribute as effectively as possible to the successful conclusion of an adequate and effective treaty eliminating nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the sea-bed and ocean floor.

14. As far as the second point is concerned -- the question of establishing international machinery for the verification of possible violations of the provisions of the treaty -- my delegation continues to believe that the establishment of such machinery is premature, if not altogether unnecessary. The argument has been advanced that what is satisfactory for the main Powers may not necessarily be admissible for the remaining ones. Although at first sight there seems to be some logic in that way of thinking, one must take into account that the main military Powers are not the only Powers with advanced maritime technology and possessing the appropriate equipment for carrying out effective verification on the sea-bed should the need for it arise. Therefore a division on this question along such lines does not seem to be relevant.

(Mr. Zybylski, Poland)

15. On the other hand, the method of observation, assistance and co-operation between States parties to the treaty contains an important political factor as regards ways of solving differences between States. Mutual assistance and voluntary international co-operation promote better understanding among nations, thus strengthening the climate of confidence which we so badly need if we want to achieve substantive progress in the field of disarmament.

16. Approaching the problem of verification with a sense of realism, with a determined will to arrive at an agreement, we must resist the temptation to exercise excessive and complex control, which in the last analysis would be extremely costly. Should international machinery for control of this treaty be established, that machinery would have to be properly equipped in order to perform its functions independently. Who is going to secure the sophisticated equipment for that and who is going to pay for it? The funds at the disposal of the United Nations and other international organizations are already insufficient for carrying out the desired programme of assistance to the developing countries and other programmes of technical assistance. As we were reminded at the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Sigvard Eklund, the Agency which he directs has elaborated a number of important programmes of assistance to the developing countries in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The only thing that prevents their being carried out is the lack of funds. Can we in those circumstances suggest the spending of a considerable amount of money on a scheme which has no practical utility for the time being?

17. Having in mind that the draft treaty provides in article VI for a review conference five years after its entry into force --

> "... in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any relevant technological developments" (CCD/269/Rev.2) --

it seems to us that the provisions for verification contained in the newly-drafted article III are fully adequate at the present stage of technological development.

18. Before leaving the area of verification I would like to say a few words about the statement made by the representative of Canada, Mr. Ignatieff, on 28 April. I shall quote the following passage from that statement:

(Mr. Zybylski, Poland)

"While welcoming these developments in the thinking of the co-Chairmen as reflected in the latest revised draft, I have to note also an important omission in the present draft as regards verification. The present draft text makes no provision for recourse to appropriate international procedure or good offices -- including those of the Secretary-General of the United Nations." (CCD/PV.468, para. 8)

I have dealt at length with the question of international machinery for verification of this treaty. I need not go into further detail. As for the good offices of the Secretary-General, my delegation sees in this proposal a limitation that narrows this widely-recognized international procedure. Conflicts may arise in situations where the good offices of another political or moral authority may prove more desirable and more effective. The result of the good offices of Soviet Premier Kosygin at the meeting in Tashkent where a solution for the 1966 conflict between India and Pakistan was elaborated speaks in favour of not limiting the exercise of good offices to the United Nations Secretary-General and not incorporating it in the text of the treaty.

19. The arguments of the Canadian and other delegations dealing with those specific points of the verification system provided for in the treaty before us did not convince my delegation. I hope that the clarification I have tried to furnish to this Committee will help members to understand the position of my Government.

20. My delegation fully endorses the view expressed by our Soviet co-Chairman when he described the new draft of article III as "a synthesis of the views and positions of States on the problem of control ..." (CCD/PV.467, para. 15). We are happy to note that the main ideas formulated in the amendment submitted by the delegation of Argentina at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly (A/C.1/997) have in substance been incorporated in the new draft. We also welcome the new article VIII as an encouragement for the establishment of zones free from nuclear weapons.

21. The Polish delegation considers the new draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof to be a document containing all the elements necessary to make it universally acceptable. We are fully

(Mr. Zybylski, Poland)

aware that a document based on a compromise cannot take account of all the suggestions put forward during the discussion of this item in this Committee and in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. We are happy to note that the great majority of them found their way into the new draft.

22. But before concluding may I be permitted to quote the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont? When speaking about the verification procedure of this treaty in the First Committee at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, he said: "if the parties to any agreement of this kind demand complete certainty on this score, then the probability is that there will be no agreement at all ...". And he went on to say: "No one is going to get all he wants; but this is what negotiation is all about, and this is what international agreement means." (A/C.1/PV.1694, provisional, p.23) May I add that this is exactly what we mean by a compromise solution?

23. We still have some very important items on our agenda at this session. Let us complete this one successfully so that we can tackle the others as soon as possible in order to be able to report honourably on the result of our work for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

24. Mr. TANAKA (Japan): First of all I should like to express my deep appreciation for the warm welcome extended to me by members of this Committee. It is indeed a great pleasure for me to be able to take part in the discussions of this Committee at the very time when it is taking an important step towards the goal of the Disarmament Decade; and I will do all in my power to co-operate with the other members of this Committee to make our discussions even more fruitful.

25. The United Nations General Assembly adopted last year resolution 2602 E (XXIV) (CCD/275) relating to the Disarmament Decade, in which it requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to work out a comprehensive disarmament programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session. In response to that request a number of invaluable suggestions were put forward at the last

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

session of this Committee. Now, during this session, we are to prepare a programme to be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

26. In formulating a disarmament programme we need to make a clear-headed assessment as to how much headway it will be possible for us to make in the coming decade towards general and complete disarmament. I have to note in this context that one of the fundamental factors which make the achievement of general and complete disarmament difficult is that not all of the militarily-important States have yet taken their seats at the negotiating table. Nevertheless, some of the measures envisaged in the proposals on general and complete disarmament submitted in 1962 by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively have been achieved. For instance, the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests has been partially realized (ENDC/100/Rev.1), and treaties on the peaceful use of outer space (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), Annex) and on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/226*) have also been concluded. We regard those measures as important milestones towards general and complete disarmament. Taking these circumstances into consideration I submit that what we should do urgently in the Disarmament Decade is to deal energetically and in a concrete manner with such disarmament measures as can be taken even before all the militarily-important States are participating in disarmament negotiations; and I feel that this is a realistic approach.

27. The Committee has recognized that it is necessary to give highest priority to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. First, as for the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, much depends upon the political decisions of the two super-Powers; and that is part of the reason why we must solve the problem of how to discover adequate means of verification which will ensure compliance with a treaty relating to this question. In order to make progress in our efforts to solve this technical problem the United Nations General Assembly adopted last year, on the initiative of Canada, a resolution calling for the submission of data on national seismograph stations (2604 A (XXIV); CCD/275). As one of the co-sponsors of the resolution, my country cannot help expressing its regret that a certain number of States have refused to supply the data requested. Since we are

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

requested by the General Assembly to submit to it a special report on the results of our deliberations relating to the banning of underground nuclear weapon tests, and since we also need to make a follow-up study of the data supplied by various countries, I feel it is necessary for us to consider how to deal with the present question, taking into account the views of experts.

28. The problem of verification again presents a great obstacle in the matter of the halting of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons; but I believe that it must be possible to apply as a verification measure in this case a system of safeguards similar to that which is to be applied to non-nuclear-weapon States by the International Atomic Energy Agency under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. If there are States which find that view unacceptable, I think they should submit proposals of their own.

29. Since our work on drawing up a treaty prohibiting the emplacement on the sea-bed of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction has entered its final stage, the member States of this Committee should make a united effort to complete the formulation of a draft treaty at the earliest possible date.

30. It might be difficult, generally speaking, to take non-nuclear disarmament measures before all the militarily-important States are participating in disarmament negotiations. While admitting that, I should like to suggest that, among non-nuclear measures, the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons could be achieved at a relatively early date. That is because all the militarily-important States have undertaken, either in international instruments or in government statements, to refrain from the first use of poisonous gases and bacteriological weapons. On 21 May this year Japan deposited with the French Government its instrument of ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575, Rev.1, Annex VI) without attaching any reservation. It is well known, however, that many States have attached reservations to the Protocol, notably reservations relating to the retaliatory use of such weapons. We hope that these States will withdraw their reservations as soon as possible. At the same time we should make even more strenuous efforts towards banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, to ensure that recourse will never, in any circumstances, be had to such weapons.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

31. We should also do our utmost to achieve universal adherence to the treaties on arms control or disarmament which have been concluded in the past. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force on 5 March this year; but the safeguards agreements to be concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with article III of the Treaty still depend on future negotiations. I should like to point out, in that connexion, that in order to make the non-proliferation Treaty effective the participation of as many States as possible, especially all the potential nuclear-weapon States, is essential. That is part of the reason why we consider that safeguards agreements should be so formulated as to be acceptable to those States which are promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As one of the major industrial Powers, Japan attaches great importance to the progress and results of the negotiations relating to the conclusion of safeguards agreements.

32. It is indeed welcome that strategic arms limitation talks have been initiated between the United States and the Soviet Union with a view to achieving the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date; and we sincerely hope that the two States will push forward in their pursuit of the objectives of the negotiations without being influenced by momentary fluctuations in the international situation. The success of those talks would certainly contribute to the lessening of tensions in East-West relations and, furthermore, to the strengthening of the security of States throughout the world. I believe, therefore, that the entire world eagerly desires the success of the talks, and I earnestly hope that the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union will not disappoint the hopes of the world.

33. While general and complete disarmament is the earnest wish of humanity, I believe that my country, which firmly adheres to its Constitution, which renounces war, is in a position to play a unique role in achieving that objective. We are well aware that disarmament and security are closely interrelated and we have no intention of turning our eyes away from the hard fact that the national security of the States of the world is dependent upon the existence of a military balance; nor can we deny that there are extremely difficult problems involved in achieving general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

34. One of the prerequisites for attaining the goal of general and complete disarmament is the participation of all the militarily-important States; and we hope that the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of France will take part in international disarmament negotiations as soon as possible. Pending the participation of those two States in this Committee, we should welcome the holding of talks between States outside the Committee for the relaxation of international tension and the achievement of various disarmament measures. With the development of weapons of mass destruction there has evolved among the militarily-important States a sense of mutual restraint with regard to the use of such weapons; and all those States now have bilateral channels of communication. I am convinced that it is the strengthening of such channels and the evolution of a sense of collective responsibility for international security without regard to differences in social systems or to the conflict of national interests that will direct us towards the way to general and complete disarmament.

35. The question of verification has in the past prevented the achievement of measures of disarmament. While differences in conditions between States are primarily responsible for our failure to solve the verification problem, technical developments in recent years have provided us with some of the answers to that problem. Moreover, increased communication throughout the world is an irreversible trend. The decade of the 1970s, which has been declared the Disarmament Decade, will also be a time of rapid change. It is my firm belief that the replacement of suspicion and distrust by the principle of openness and the spirit of international solidarity is the key to the attainment of general and complete disarmament.

36. The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): In view of the request contained in General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV) (CCD/275) calling upon all States which have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI) in the course of 1970 in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of its signing and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, I am sure I shall be speaking on behalf of all members of the Committee if I request Ambassador Tanaka to convey our congratulations to the Government of Japan.

37. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): One of the important results of the discussion of chemical and bacteriological weapons at the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly was its adoption of a resolution inviting -

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

"... all States which have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol in the course of 1970 in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of its signing and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations" (2603 B (XXIV), CCD/275).

This is the resolution to which you yourself, Mr. Chairman have just referred.

38. Yesterday, 17 June, was the forty-fifth anniversary, to the day, of the signing of that agreement. In this connexion we would say, first of all, that we have noted with interest the statement made by U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on the forty-fifth anniversary of the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare (A/7575/Rev.1, Annex VI). That statement concerns an important question, the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and we shall study it with due care. In connexion with yesterday's forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Protocol we would observe that the Protocol gave expression to mankind's desire to consolidate, in the form of a treaty between States, the prohibition of the use of those agents for military purposes. Of course, the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war has always been condemned. The history of international relations provides clear evidence that prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons for military purposes has become a generally-recognized rule of international law. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 reflects this universal awareness, which is why the Protocol states that its purpose is "that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations".

39. The signing of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, soon after the end of the First World War, reflected the peoples' condemnation of the use of chemical weapons during that war. The wave of revulsion caused throughout the world by the use of chemical weapons called for a juridical confirmation of what was already unchallenged politically and morally: the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. At the same time a provision was inserted in the Protocol extending the prohibition to bacteriological methods of warfare.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

40. The past forty-five years have convincingly demonstrated the importance of the Geneva Protocol, which lies above all in the fact that the Protocol has served and continues to serve as an important means of preventing the outbreak of a war involving the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Who can say what disasters might have befallen mankind during the Second World War if chemical and bacteriological weapons had been widely used in it? Hitlerite Germany dared not disregard the warning of the allied Powers that the use of such weapons in warfare could not be tolerated. That warning, as we know, was based on the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

41. The Protocol is becoming even more important in our day. The progress of chemical and biological science, which has brought great benefits to mankind, has at the same time made it possible to create types of chemical and bacteriological agents whose use might not only inflict enormous loss of human life and incalculable economic damage but might even adversely affect the future development of human civilization. In that connexion it is particularly significant that the prohibition laid down in the Geneva Protocol has a universal character, comprising all forms of chemical and bacteriological weapons without exception. In its resolution 2603 A (XXIV) the United Nations General Assembly designedly drew the attention of States throughout the world to this fact by stating that the Geneva Protocol --

> "... embodies the generally recognized rules of international law prohibiting the use in international armed conflicts of all biological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any technical developments" (CCD/275).

This resolution undoubtedly put an end to all attempts to place any other construction on the contents of the Geneva Protocol or to minimize its significance.

42. The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that in recent years many States have acceded to the Geneva Protocol, thus bearing witness to the effectiveness and importance of that international instrument. Unfortunately it must be noted that not all the countries of the world have decided to condemn the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons outright. The United States,

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

a Power of very great military importance, has not yet ratified the Geneva Protocol. The concern felt by the peoples of the world on that account is increased by the knowledge that the United States possesses a large arsenal of the types of weapons prohibited by the Protocol.

43. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 was actually the first agreement prohibiting the use in war of one of the weapons of mass destruction. In that sense it is a truly historic document. The conclusion of the Protocol demonstrates that it is possible to reach effective agreements prohibiting weapons of mass destruction and to define clearly the course to be followed to achieve that end. That is particularly important at this moment, when we are conducting negotiations for the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons. As many delegations observed at the Disarmament Committee's last series of meetings, the Geneva Protocol should become the starting point for further measures designed to achieve the complete elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons from the life of human society.

44. The draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons submitted by the socialist countries (A/7655) and now before the Committee on Disarmament proceeds from those very premises. Under the preamble to the convention the parties would recognize the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, reaffirm their adherence to the purposes and principles of the Protocol and condemn all actions contrary to it. The Convention, like the Protocol, covers both chemical and bacteriological weapons. We take this opportunity to express once again our conviction that the conclusion of an international agreement based on the text submitted by the socialist countries will complete the work begun by the Geneva Protocol.

45. On the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Protocol, we express the hope that the Committee on Disarmament will speed its work on the problem of freeing mankind from the threat of warfare with chemical and bacteriological weapons. This would be the best continuation of what was started in 1925 and would meet the responsibilities placed upon our Committee.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 471st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Sule Kolo, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland, Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and by the Chairman.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 23 June 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.472
23 June 1970
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 23 June 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. K. AHMED (Pakistan)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. A.F. DUMONT
	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Brazil:	Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. T. PETROV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
	Mr. R.E. MOORE
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. J. STRUCKA
	Mr. F. MARESKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
	Mr. G. ALEMU
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. J. PETRAN
	Mr. I. SARKADI
	Mr. F. GAJDA
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:	Mr. H. TANAKA
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
	Mr. T. SENGOKU
	Mr. K. ANDO
Mexico:	Mr. J. CASTANEDA
	Mr. B. SEPULVEDA
	Mr. R. VALERO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. B. DASHTSEREN
Morocco:	Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
Netherlands:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
	Mr. E. DOS
Nigeria:	Mr. L.A. MALIKI
Pakistan:	Mr. K. AHMED
	Mr. T.O. HYDER
Poland:	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
Romania:	Mr. N. CHILIE
	Mrs. F. DINU
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. I. VIRGIN
	Mr. T. WULFF
	Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
	Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
	Mr. Y.C. NAZARKINE
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. E.S. EL REEDY
	Mr. Y. RIZK
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD
	Mr. R. HOULISTON
	Mr. L.W. BOYES
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.F. HEIDLE
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Pakistan): I declare open the 472nd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): It is essential for meaningful consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament to appreciate the context in which we strive to make progress towards this goal. The interrelationship of disarmament and international affairs is central. The disarmament policies of all governments are only one aspect of their foreign policies; and their disarmament policies, like their foreign policies, are shaped by their aspirations, their expectations, their concerns and even their fears regarding the world situation, and by what they judge to be their national security interests.

3. The resolution on general and complete disarmament adopted by the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly (2602 (XXIV); CCD/275) differed in several respects from those of earlier years. The most important difference was that, instead of urging us to renew our efforts towards progress in reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament, this resolution requested that we work out a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament as a guide for our further work and negotiations. The United States, Members will recall, had reservations about the language of this resolution; but we voted for it because we believed it was both reasonable and important for this Committee to take up questions that would be involved in the elaboration of any programme regarding disarmament.

4. In my statement today I intend to discuss the question of general and complete disarmament in relation to that resolution. In doing so I shall first talk about the context of general and complete disarmament -- that is, the progress which must be made in the world if we are to make real progress towards general and complete disarmament. I shall then discuss in general terms arms control and disarmament measures and their relation to the goal of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

5. I want to make clear at the outset that we continue to support the goal of general and complete disarmament. At the same time, however, I think that all of us will agree that progress towards general and complete disarmament cannot be made in a vacuum but will have to be accompanied by concrete progress towards a peaceful world. Such a peaceful world, in which general and complete disarmament could be realized, would be:

- A world in which the rule of law, and not the use of force, prevailed in relations between States;

- A world in which there were agreed standards of international behaviour;

- A world in which effective means of enforcing international agreements and settling disputes had been established and were utilized;

- A world in which there prevailed a spirit of confidence, openness, and a recognized community of interests among States.

6. This is, basically, the context of general and complete disarmament foreseen in the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of 1961. While we must be careful, in discussing disarmament guidelines, not to lift out of context excerpts from earlier agreements, it is relevant to note that the first of the 1961 Principles states that -

> "The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." (ENDC/5)

7. We believe that progress towards such a world, towards halting the competition in arms and towards general and complete disarmament can and indeed must be made. As we look back over the 1960s we see that advances have already been made. As we look forward to the 1970s we see reason to hope that greater progress will be registered. But continuing progress towards general and complete disarmament will not depend exclusively on our planning or negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It will depend in large part upon the existence of a suitable international political climate, important aspects of which will be:

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

- The steadfastness of States in pursuing their interests in a spirit of accommodation and in accordance with the fundamental principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations;

- Strengthening the United Nations through the creation of effective machinery for international peacekeeping;

- Regional efforts to develop institutions to preserve the peace and to cope with local problems and disputes;

- A desire on the part of all important military Powers to associate themselves with existing constraints on armaments and to enhance prospects for effective disarmament negotiations.

8. In discussing the framework for a durable peace in his report on foreign policy for the 1970s, President Nixon pointed out that "peace requires a willingness to negotiate". And he went on to say that we "are working toward the day when all nations will have a stake in peace, and will therefore be partners in its maintenance."

9. With respect to regional peacekeeping, Articles 33 and 52 of the United Nations Charter envisage regional efforts that can contribute to preserving peace. We should note that some successes in regional mediation of disputes have been scored in the past decade. More effective regional action should be encouraged as the institutions for regional action evolve. And, if we are to move towards a world conducive to greater progress in disarmament, it is of importance that the United Nations do the job called for by its Charter in maintaining peace. United Nations peacekeeping should be developed to contain violence and to prevent the escalation of conflicts. What is required here is the determination of all United Nations Members to use United Nations institutions effectively. The co-operation of contending parties will certainly be required, as well as the support of those nations on which the United Nations must depend for manpower and funds.

10. I have touched on issues that are beyond the immediate range of our negotiations in order to highlight the context in which progress toward general and complete disarmament can be made. It is that context that we must keep constantly in mind if our debate on this issue is to be realistic.

11. I shall turn now to some general aspects of arms races and of arms control and disarmament measures. When we speak about stopping arms races we should keep in mind the great diversity of forces at work in the world making arms races what they

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

are, the wide range of governmental and even individual activities related to them, and the variety of approaches that have been suggested for bringing arms races under control. We are dealing here indeed with the realm of modern science and technology, with decisions about weapon systems, force levels and deployments, and with concepts of deterrence, stability and credibility. Our subject is inextricably bound together with basic national security concerns, with alliance and treaty commitments, and with other facets of foreign, domestic and ideological policies. It is influenced by the activities of all States interacting with one another and by domestic priorities and public attitudes.

12. I have mentioned a few of the almost limitless aspects of our problem, not to discourage the Committee from taking up the challenge the United Nations General Assembly has presented to us, but rather as a backdrop for the approach that we shall suggest today. This approach involves, first, a recognition of the context in which we in this Committee work -- that is, a continually-changing world whose future, as we all know, neither the representatives in these negotiations nor their governments can confidently predict or completely control. It is this world, and not abstract concepts, that will be the framework for arms control and disarmament.

13. If we stop to think for a minute about the world as it is likely to develop during the 1970s, we must recognize that it will be neither a static nor a placid world. The pattern of international politics is changing, and perhaps faster now than at any time since the Second World War. This process of change, of accelerating scientific discoveries and social evolution, is inevitable -- in fact, it is essential for progress; but it is also a process accompanied by turbulence. It is in terms of this world that governments will decide their disarmament policies during the decade of the 1970s.

14. I noticed with interest at our meeting last Thursday that the representative of Japan expressed some important ideas about general and complete disarmament, which I think it would be well for us to keep in mind. Referring to the decade of the 1970s, the Disarmament Decade, as a time of rapid change, he said:

> "... the replacement of suspicion and distrust by the principle of openness and the spirit of international solidarity is the key to the attainment of general and complete disarmament." (CCD/PV.471, para. 35)

Mr. Tanaka also called to our attention that disarmament and security are closely interrelated. He said:

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

"... we have no intention of turning our eyes away from the hard fact that the national security of the States of the world is dependent upon the existence of a military balance; nor can we deny that there are extremely difficult problems involved in achieving general and complete disarmament." (ibid., para.33)

15. There is, of course, another side to the interaction between disarmament and world affairs. The successful negotiation of arms control and disarmament measures, and broad adherence to them, can contribute to the improvement of international relations. The elaboration of arms-control treaties reflecting the interests of many countries demonstrates how relations among States can be altered and organized to the general benefit. And the implementation of such measures encourages a broad spectrum of international co-operation. This experience in turn helps to establish the mutual confidence that can lead to still further progress towards disarmament and towards a peaceful world in general.

16. There are, of course, other direct benefits from progress in arms control and disarmament. President Nixon pointed out in his foreign policy report that --

"The traditional course of seeking security primarily through military strength raises several problems in a world of multiplying strategic weapons:

-- Modern technology makes any balance precarious and prompts new efforts at ever higher levels of complexity;

-- Such an arms race absorbs resources, talents and energies;

-- The more intense the competition, the greater the uncertainty about the other side's intentions;

-- The higher the levels of armaments, the greater the violence and devastation should deterrence fail."

17. The considerations I have described lead us to view arms control and disarmament as a complex of efforts at many levels, of efforts that attempt to deal, at times simultaneously, with the many individual but interrelated aspects of the whole range of arms and security issues. For so complex a field cannot be dealt with effectively through one simple, direct process.

18. There are several ways in which progress in arms control and disarmament can be achieved:

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

- Through multilateral negotiation of global measures like the limited test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the outer-space Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), Annex), and the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*);

- Through regional negotiations and arrangements such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186, pp. 12-33), possible mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe, and possible arms limitations in areas of local conflict;

- Through bilateral negotiations like the current United States-Soviet discussions on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT); and

- Through unilateral decisions which might be emulated or reciprocated by other States.

19. While formal negotiations have so far led to the greatest achievements, and while multilateral negotiations of global measures are of particular significance for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, we should not overlook the importance of steps that States can take individually. These can include decisions to forego or limit new weapons systems, to scale down standing forces, to encourage public awareness of the need for restraint in arms development, and to improve the possibilities for effective verification of agreements.

20. In referring to his decision on chemical and biological weapons, President Nixon stated that -

"We are prepared to take any unilateral arms control action that will not compromise our security and will minimize the danger that certain weapons will ever be developed or used by any nation".

21. Turning from the method to the substance of arms control and disarmament measures, we can identify several forms of classification. First, measures can be considered, as they were in the agenda adopted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1968 (ENDC/236, p. 3), in terms of:

- Measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament;

- Non-nuclear measures; other collateral measures; and

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

- General and complete disarmament. They can also be considered, along the lines suggested in our report last year to the General Assembly of the United Nations, as:

- Confidence-building measures;

- Measures to prevent armaments; measures to limit armament; and

- Measures of disarmament (CCD/274, p.7). There is another method of categorization which I think we should keep in mind, namely:

- Measures already achieved;

- Measures that might be negotiated under present conditions;

- And measures that might be negotiated in the future as progress is made toward a peaceful world.

22. The United States delegation believes that all of those classifications are valid; but the last one seems to us to be the most useful in terms of advancing our work. For unless a measure accords with the realities of world affairs, the measure will not be achieved simply by including it in some sort of schedule. It is therefore a major responsibility of this Committee to identify those measures that do accord with present world realities or the realities of the immediate future.

23. It will be central in a discussion based on this approach to have the expression by any delegation of its views on whether particular measures can and should be elaborated immediately or considered at a later time. We believe, however, that it is likely to be futile and perhaps even harmful to engage in debates in which we attempt to produce an agreement on a particular order of measures. For the point of our discussions should not be to draw up elaborate charts -- such charts do not determine whether proposals become widely-accepted international agreements. Rather, the point is to develop a consensus on which proposals are ripe or will soon be ripe for serious, detailed negotiations.

24. The main point, then, of the 1969 resolution of the United Nations on general and complete disarmament is, in our view, a very simple, straightforward question: where do we stand today in the field of arms control and disarmament, and what are our prospects for the future? In answering this question it is useful first to review what has already been achieved, since past efforts have left us with unfinished business and have perhaps opened opportunities for further steps.

25. One of the most important measures achieved through negotiations before the Second World War was the 1925 Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev. 1, Annex VI). This

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

measure limits the use, or at least the first use, of certain types of weapons. It does not, however, prevent or limit the development of these armaments. That task is still ahead of us.

26. After the war the first measure achieved was the Antarctic Treaty[1/], which is now more than a decade old. This measure limits all armaments in one part of the world; it has encouraged international co-operation and scientific research, and it has been an example for later agreements.

27. In 1963 we achieved the limited test-ban Treaty, which placed certain restraints on the testing of nuclear weapons and limited radio-active contamination of the atmosphere. The preamble expressed the intention of the parties to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons.

28. In 1967 negotiations were completed on the Latin-American nuclear-free zone, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, a measure which prohibits the acquisition of nuclear weapons in a specific region of the world. Moreover, 1967 saw the entry into force of the outer-space Treaty, which prevents the introduction of nuclear weapons in an area which man is just beginning to explore. The outer-space Treaty made a significant contribution to strategic stability.

29. The non-proliferation Treaty, which came into effect this year, is, we belive, the most significant arms-control step to date. The non-proliferation Treaty has highlighted the need for further arms-control and disarmament negotiations; and these are in fact under way today. The Treaty will facilitate the continuation and expansion of international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and the successful implementation of the safeguards envisaged in its article III will represent an unprecedented advance in the scope and importance of international safeguards.

30. I turn now to measures that might be negotiated in the light of the present world situation. During the past year the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has devoted careful study to the problem of the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. An early agreement banning biological agents is clearly possible; it would be a significant disarmament measure. We have made a great

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1/ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 402, pp. 71 et seq.

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

deal of progress in negotiating a prohibition on the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. I might note here that the complexities we have encountered in fashioning a widely-acceptable measure for the sea-bed illustrate how international concerns outside the area of arms control and disarmament interact with the work of this Committee.

31. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is also studying the problems involved in achieving a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, a subject to which the General Assembly has attached great urgency. The United States delegation has proposed negotiation of a cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons; and a number of other delegations have strongly supported that proposal.

32. That is not a compendium of all measures that have in one form or another been put forward by various delegations; but it is sufficiently extensive to bring us to the next question: what further measures do members of the Committee believe have serious possibilities of being negotiated now or in the near future? The identification of such measures would be an important element of the task that the General Assembly has placed before us.

33. The United States delegation cannot presume to answer that question for the Committee. We do, however, have a suggestion as to how we might proceed -- a suggestion consistent with the desire of several delegations that we find ways to achieve a higher output and a broader scope for our work. Our suggestion is that the members of the Committee look at the problem of arms races as a whole and examine which elements are already being attacked and which are not. Most measures of disarmament and arms limitation that have been proposed in recent years deal principally with weapons of mass destruction. That is as it should be. These weapons must be brought under control. But should we not be concerned about other aspects of arms competition?

34. I should like to suggest that all members of the Committee consider what measures might be achieved relating to armaments that they already possess or might feel some pressure to acquire. How could such measures be negotiated? When might they be considered? Such suggestions would, of course, be particularly

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

valuable coming from the countries directly concerned. We make that proposal in all seriousness, even though I know that some may be tempted to pass it off with a reference to "disarming the unarmed". In fact we all have and acquire arms; and the responsibility for controlling them in a world in which conflict is likely to continue lies with the entire international community. Moreover, progress towards general and complete disarmament will be made not only by halting present arms races but also by preventing the initiation of new arms races. It is easier for nations to reach agreements now to prevent arms races than to attempt to control them once they are under way.

35. Some delegations have suggested that progress could be made if the United States and the Soviet Union were to revise their general and complete disarmament plans of the early 1960s in the light of developments since that time. But I wonder here whether we cannot learn from our earlier experience. What progress was made when we attempted that approach to disarmament? After twenty-one meetings in 1962 the Committee adopted, ad referendum, a draft preamble for the treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/L.11/Rev.1). That preamble had three sets of brackets indicating basic language on which agreement had not been reached. After forty-five meetings the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a paper covering three articles. The title of that paper was "Working Draft of Part I of the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (in a Peaceful World)" (ENDC/40/Rev.1). The three articles outlined in that co-Chairmen's draft contained some thirty sets of brackets indicating language preferred by one or the other Government but not acceptable to both. After twenty more meetings the United States and the Soviet Union were able to propose one more article, article 4 (ENDC/55), and that with nine sets of brackets. I would hope that members of the Committee who think that this approach is productive would review the verbatim records of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for that period. In fact, we began to make real progress towards general and complete disarmament when we began to examine what we could accomplish with respect to individual measures.

36. When we look to the future we can expect that further moves towards disarmament will be interrelated, as steps have been in the past. Every new measure introduces a new factor into international affairs. Some measures may serve as a catalyst

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

for further progress; others will increase international co-operation. Both our experience in carrying out important disarmament measures and the general political situation will inevitably have an important bearing on the scope and nature of subsequent agreements.

37. Let us keep it in mind that arms-control measures, singly and in succession, have benefits beyond their immediate specific terms. They have an important effect on the atmosphere in which governments make their decisions concerning armaments and disarmament possibilities. During the 1950s most governments probably expected that the arms race would continue to spiral upwards. Today, however, many are no longer certain that this will happen. The measures that have been achieved, the forces of international co-operation they have set in motion and the further negotiations they have engendered have helped to create an expectation throughout the world that armaments may level off or even spiral downwards. Thus, although the problems with which we are dealing often seem intractable, we must continue to try to solve them in a realistic and purposeful way, keeping in mind that too slow a pace could result in a loss of momentum which could impair the relatively favourable atmosphere that our earlier measures helped to create.

38. I have set forth in some detail today the views of the United States delegation on how we believe progress can be made towards our common goal of general and complete disarmament. I hope that during this session other delegations which have thoughts to contribute will also express their views on general and complete disarmament in our plenary meetings. Our delegation believes that that is the best way to proceed in considering this complex subject, since it will give all of us an opportunity to exchange ideas and to study carefully the contributions of all members of the Committee.

39. Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): On behalf of the Hungarian delegation, may I say a few words of welcome to the newly-appointed representatives of Bulgaria, Ambassador Petrov; of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka; and of Mongolia, Ambassador Erdembileg? It is also a pleasure for us to see again in our midst the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Castañeda, and Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, representative of Argentina. The Hungarian delegation assures them all of its sincere co-operation.

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

40. During its last session the Committee paid great attention to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof (CCD/269/Rev.1). In the view of the Hungarian delegation the joint draft treaty, revised for the second time (CCD/269/Rev.2), which was submitted on 23 April by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States, promotes and ensures the further progress of our work. It is on that draft treaty that I wish to offer my brief comments today.

41. My delegation would like first of all to congratulate the two co-Chairmen on the submission of that new version, whereby they have contributed significantly to the elaboration of a draft treaty to be presented to the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. They have facilitated also the early and successful conclusion of the negotiations on the subject.

42. Having studied the revised draft treaty which is now before the Committee, my delegation believes that with regard to substance and legal aspects it is a refinement of former versions.

43. That, we feel, is proved by articles I and II, which remove the possibilities of misunderstanding and differences of opinion concerning the determination of the area of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for the purpose of the treaty. The definition incorporated in the latest version does not affect the views and standpoints concerning certain issues of international maritime law, of States that are not parties to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone signed in Geneva on 29 April 1958.[1/]

44. A newly-drafted text for article III was also presented by the co-authors. Having studied it, we can see that the present wording of that article makes allowances for the observations and remarks put forward by a number of States during the debate on the previous draft. As Mr. Roshchin pointed out when he presented the revised draft at our meeting on 23 April this year:

1/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 516, pp. 205 et seq.

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

"... the text of this article should be regarded as a synthesis of the views and positions of States on the problem of control over compliance with the obligations assumed under the treaty."
(CCD/PV.467, para. 15)

45. My delegation is in full agreement with that remark; and therefore we regard as disquieting and unacceptable the inclusion in the draft treaty of such measures as those urged by the representative of Canada on 28 April (CCD/PV.468, paras. 8 and 9). In our view, insistence on the inclusion of such measures would only make the situation unnecessarily complicated and would further delay the elaboration of the draft treaty, the more so since the present wording of article III provides an opportunity for all States parties concerned to participate, through mutual consultations and measures, in the verification of the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the treaty. On the other hand, the chances of the United Nations Secretary-General or any other outstanding international personality being able to carry out good offices would be neither increased nor lessened by the mere fact of whether or not this question was mentioned in a certain international treaty.

46. In the view of the Hungarian delegation the verification procedures contained in article III, supplemented by the possibility that the States concerned, if they felt it necessary, could refer the matter to the Security Council, provide a proper settlement of the question of verification. We are convinced that the elaborate system of verification proposed can promote the observation and implementation of the treaty and will therefore provide the States parties to the treaty with adequate guarantees.

47. As a great number of speakers have emphatically stressed, the purpose of this treaty is the prevention of the spread of the nuclear arms race to the sea-bed and the ocean floor. It is not meant, however, to take a stand on or to settle those problems of international maritime law which should fall within the competence of other international conferences and should be the subject of other international treaties. My delegation believes that article IV of the draft serves to avoid any misunderstanding and to ensure the achievement of full agreement, since its text expresses clearly and unambiguously the standpoint

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

in this respect of the parties to the treaty. We can only welcome the idea of the co-authors that this question should be settled in a separate article -- that is, article IV of the revised draft treaty.

48. It was on the suggestion of Mexico that article VIII was included in the new draft. We find its significance to be that it prevents any possible misunderstanding or contradiction that may arise from other international treaties of a similar nature.

49. My delegation has had occasion previously to express its view on the third preambular paragraph. We would have preferred to see that provision among the operative articles of the draft treaty, in a manner similar to that of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*). If such an operative article were included in the treaty, it would define more definitely the aims which the signatories are determined to achieve.

50. We raise that question now because at the meeting of our Committee on 28 April the Canadian representative requested the co-authors of the draft to consider the possibility of including in article III a reference to "international procedures or good offices -- including those of the Secretary-General of the United Nations." (CCD/PV.468, para. 8) If the co-authors find it possible at a later stage of our negotiations to study the suggestion of the Canadian delegation, which was supported at the same meeting by the representative of Italy (ibid., para. 25), my delegation would request them to study also the feasibility of making the present third preambular paragraph into a separate article in the operative part of the draft treaty. We believe that would make a significant contribution to the elaboration of an even more refined draft, and would create harmony with the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, which is already in effect.

51. The draft treaty submitted on 23 April by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States pays due attention to the observations and suggestions for modification or addition that were put forward when this Committee or the General Assembly considered previous texts. The Hungarian delegation believes that all the conditions now exist for the conclusion of the consideration of the

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

draft treaty as soon as possible. My delegation therefore accepts the text of the draft presented at the 467th meeting by the two co-Chairmen of this Committee, and supports its submission to the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly. We do so in the belief that this draft treaty will constitute the first step towards the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 472nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Kamaluddin Ahmed, representative of Pakistan.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America and Hungary.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 25 June 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.473
25 June 1970
ENGLISH

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 25 June 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI (Poland)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. A.F. DUMONT
	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Brazil:	Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
	Mr. L.F. PALEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. T. PETROV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
	Mr. R.E. MOORE
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. J. STRUCKA
	Mr. F. MARESKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
	Mr. G. AIEMU
Hungary:	Mr. J. PETRAN
	Mr. I. SARKADI
	Mr. F. GAJDA
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:	Mr. H. TANAKA
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
	Mr. T. SENGOKU
	Mr. A. TOMIKAWA
Mexico:	Mr. J. CASTANEDA
	Mr. B. SEPULVEDA
	Mr. R. VALERO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
	Mr. B. DASHTSEREN
Morocco:	Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
Netherland:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
	Mr. E. BOS
Nigeria:	Mr. L.A. MALIKI
Pakistan:	Mr. K. AHMED
	Mr. T.O. HYDER
Poland:	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
Romania:	Mr. N. CHILIE
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. I. VIRGIN
	Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
	Mr. L.A. MASTENKOV
	Mr. Y.C. NAZARKINE
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. E.S. EL REEDY
	Mr. Y. RIZK
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD
	Mr. R. HOULISTON
	Mr. L.W. BOYES
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I declare open the 473rd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): May I take this opportunity to associate myself with the welcome already extended to those heads of delegations who have joined us for the first time at this session, and to welcome back old friends? I wish also to welcome back the representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Epstein, and members of the United Nations Secretariat, who continue to provide for us such efficient services.

3. Proceeding from the discussions which took place during the first part of this session and the working papers which were then presented, and profiting from the review of arms-control issues during the recess, we are now required, I believe, to consider more specifically what can be achieved during the remainder of this year. In this first Canadian intervention I should like to review how my delegation regards that task.

4. With respect to the revised joint draft treaty on the sea-bed submitted by the co-Chairmen on 23 April (CCD/269/Rev.2), the Canadian delegation is hopeful that early substantial progress can be achieved and that the treaty can be completed at this session. This draft could then be presented to the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly in the expectation that the result of our negotiations during the major part of two sessions will lead to the conclusion of a sea-bed treaty by the end of 1970. That, I think, should be our immediate objective.

5. As I indicated in my statement in late April (CCD/468), our delegation believes that we may have just about reached the point at which maximum consensus has been achieved on the substance of the draft text, with the exception of the point I raised at that time regarding article III. This relates to the question of assurances about recourse to international procedures in helping States which have cause for concern regarding non-compliance with the treaty. I do not propose at this stage to elaborate further upon that statement, which remains the Canadian position, other than to emphasize, in view of certain comments which have been made, that the Canadian proposals for verification put forward in document A/C.1/992 do not envisage the establishment of some new, elaborate and expensive international machinery; they

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

merely seek to reiterate, within the context of the sea-bed treaty which we are considering, the right already available on a multilateral basis under the Charter to all Members of the United Nations to have recourse when necessary to the good offices of the United Nations, without prejudice of course to any good offices which may be available on a bilateral basis.

6. Turning now to the question of chemical and biological warfare, we welcome the progress made during the last session in clarifying some of the underlying issues. The Canadian Government policy regarding chemical and biological weapons presented in my statement of 24 March (CCD/PV.460, paras. 23-38) was not of course a substitute for or a detraction from the multilateral action which is needed to strengthen and to supplement the Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI).

7. Indeed, what my delegation has been seeking is to reinforce the Geneva Protocol of 1925 by moving from the prohibition of first use of chemical and biological weapons which results from the reservations to that Protocol to an effective ban on the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons. The Canadian Government policy statement was made as a contribution to the clarification and amplification of national positions on this important matter, with the hope of promoting a consensus which might prepare the way for the negotiation of a treaty or treaties to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons.

8. This Committee is under an obligation laid down by the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly -- in this instance resolution 2603 B (CCD/275) -- to continue negotiations on chemical and biological warfare and to provide a report on all aspects of the problem to the next session of the General Assembly. During our spring session several important statements were made on this item and some interesting working papers were considered. In our view, these revealed with increasing clarity that the crux of the problem is the negotiation of agreed and adequate verification procedures to ensure compliance with any treaty or treaties. We suggest that the Committee, while continuing the exchange of views on all aspects of the abolition of chemical and biological weapons, should devote its primary attention during the next few weeks to possible approaches to and solutions of the problem of verification.

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

9. In this respect we would support the suggestion put forward by my Japanese colleague (CCD/PV.456, para. 82) that a series of informal consultations with experts in attendance as required might provide optimum opportunity for progress. For our part we are prepared to participate actively in any such meetings, and we would hope to be able in due course to contribute some suggestions as to how we believe the examination of this verification problem might be advanced.

10. Completion of the work on the sea-bed treaty and progress on the question of chemical and biological warfare at this session, important as they undoubtedly are if viewed against the risks and costs of the continuing nuclear arms race, cannot be regarded as adequate responses by themselves. That is so, in our view, as gauged against current public apprehensions, or against the various resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its last session.

11. Resolution 2602 E (XXIV) gave the responsibility to this Conference to develop --

> "... a comprehensive programme ... which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations", "bearing in mind that the ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament;" (CCD/275)

The Canadian delegation views this resolution as primarily intended as an incentive to achieve progress in a systematic way on arms control and disarmament during this decade. We hope that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will not become involved in attempting to draft an elaborate and exhaustive programme for the Disarmament Decade, but will agree on a flexible formula of objectives to be presented to the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly with the Committee's endorsement. We therefore believe that we should strive towards a consensus on what might constitute a comprehensive programme of work for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

12. We agree with those who say that these objectives should, as far as possible, be spelt out in relation to specific measures, be acceptable to governments as practical proposals, and be related to current international tensions. Is it not logical, though, to expect that the principal military Powers represented on this

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

Committee should set the lead in making such suggestions, as it is their armaments above all which set the pace for the arms race as well as affecting the international climate?

13. We also agree with those who say that the time has passed for metaphysical discussions of ideal programmes, or merely the revision of matters dating back to the beginning of the previous decade. Only through the pursuit of concrete measures will this Committee attain the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, I realize that we wish to avoid an approach so empirical and pragmatic that the General Assembly of the United Nations will not be able to discern any cohesiveness, co-ordination or direction in our targets and objectives.

14. In this task we are not without foundations on which to build. The most noteworthy achievement of this Committee to date, the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*), has now come into force, and when it becomes fully effective it will, we hope, ensure that no additional countries join the "nuclear club"; and as progress towards general and complete disarmament depends primarily on effective measures to bring under control the proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertical and horizontal, measures such as the comprehensive test ban -- an item to which I will return later -- and a cut-off in the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes must in our view be an essential part of any programme we might draw up.

15. Nor can we ignore criticism which, perhaps justifiably, questions the ultimate value of agreements which limit nuclear weapons and to which major nuclear Powers are not a party. Like the representative of Japan in his intervention on 18 June (CCD/PV.471, para. 34), I agree with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who in his statement of 22 May to the Institute of Man and Science pointed to the desirability of "finding ways and means of associating all nuclear Powers, including France and the People's Republic of China", with arms control and disarmament negotiations.

16. But there is no doubt, surely, that the priority objective set for us both at the United Nations General Assembly and by our own Conference is to halt the

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

nuclear arms race. The means of bringing the nuclear arms race under restraint rest of course on political as well as technological factors. In so far as the political factors are concerned, in seeking solutions we undoubtedly have to look to a large extent to the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and other bilateral contacts between the nuclear Powers. But it is for this Conference, besides playing its political role, to examine all the technological factors involved in facilitating agreements which might lead to a halt of the nuclear arms race.

17. It is against that background that I should now like to turn to an important subject on our agenda which has not been discussed in any depth recently but which the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly considered to be a matter of urgency and about which it also requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to submit a special report to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly. I refer, of course, to the comprehensive test ban.

18. In view of the need for a special report, under the terms of resolution 2604 B (XXIV) (CCD/275) of the General Assembly, to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly next September, I should like to recall briefly some of the history and the political events which give this issue its special significance and importance.

19. Parties to the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1) are under obligation by the preamble to the Treaty to seek "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time".

20. Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty have a more general commitment to "pursue negotiations ... on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date", an obligation which applies particularly to the major nuclear Powers. The draft sea-bed treaty we are now considering also envisages a commitment to continue negotiations leading to the cessation of the arms race and to disarmament, general and complete. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty by the Committee on Disarmament would therefore be a notable achievement, both to mark the Disarmament Decade and to reassure all nations that the commitments to which I have referred are considered as binding.

21. In the meantime nuclear testing, either for peaceful or for weapons purposes, is being continued by all the nuclear Powers; although we realize that these

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

which are signatories of the partial test-ban Treaty have limited their tests to underground explosions. Why, then, the delay in completing the partial test-ban Treaty? Virtually all delegations here have recognized that the major political impediment to progress is related directly to the security considerations of the nuclear-weapon States. Clearly, until the nuclear Powers concerned are prepared to agree that the risk involved in any particular approach to a nuclear test ban is less than the risk inherent in the continued escalation of the nuclear arms race, progress can be of only a limited and preparatory nature.

22. We realize, of course, that the talks on the limitation and eventual reduction of strategic nuclear weapons have an important bearing on a comprehensive test ban. Success in the strategic arms limitation talks, we would hope, could go a considerable distance towards removing the basic impediment, to which I have referred, to a comprehensive ban on further testing.

23. Pending progress in the political and security environment in relation to which the goal of a comprehensive test ban has to be considered, however, the Canadian delegation remains convinced that some progress in finding solutions to some of the major outstanding technical problems should be pursued. Those technical problems relate, of course, to the question of effective verification, on which the positions of the major nuclear Powers involved and of many other members of the Committee on Disarmament have differed, and still differ, substantially. All delegations here would, I think, agree that the seismic component of any verification system will be large, albeit not necessarily the only component. The Canadian delegation, among others, has argued that the task of detection and identification of underground tests could be facilitated if assured access to adequate original seismological data were to be provided.

24. That brings us to General Assembly resolutions 2604 A (XXIV) and 2604 B (XXIV). The latter requests us, inter alia, "to submit a special report to the Assembly" on the results of our deliberations on a comprehensive test ban and on proposals relating to it. While we do not know what will be the exact form or content of that special report, we are firmly of the opinion, which we hope is widely shared by others here today, that the report should show that this Committee had at least taken into account the responses to the Secretary-General's questionnaire on the international exchange of seismic data referred to in

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

resolution 2604 A (XXIV). In that context we would also recall that a specific purpose of resolution 2604 A (XXIV) is, as stated in its operative paragraph 3, precisely to assist the Committee on Disarmament in its further consideration of the achievement of a comprehensive test ban.

25. In view of those decisions of the General Assembly I am sure that we shall all do our utmost to ensure that our discussions on the comprehensive test-ban question in this Committee this summer are as fruitful as possible. As regards the enquiry concerning the international availability of seismic data, I hope my colleagues may find it helpful if this morning I give the Committee a brief report on the progress made to date in response to General Assembly resolution 2604 A (XXIV), and on the basis of that report make one or two tentative suggestions for possible future action by this Committee.

26. As members of the Committee are aware, resolution 2604 A (XXIV) received widespread support at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly both in terms of votes in favour and in terms of co-sponsorship. At the same time it has to be recognized, as my Japanese colleague pointed out the other day (CCD/PV.471, para. 27), that support in the General Assembly was not as universal as we would have wished, and that some responses to the Secretary-General's enquiry were cast in somewhat negative terms. None the less, of the fifty-four responses so far received and circulated, thirty-four, from five continents, have been positive and substantive. I have been informed in fact by the Canadian technical authorities that those responses to the resolution and questionnaire form a sufficiently broad-based sample to permit some useful initial examination to be made, with what we hope may be productive results.

27. I wish to make it quite clear to my colleagues that the difficulties and delays which have been encountered have not in any way altered our view that the Committee on Disarmament itself should at this session pursue a preliminary examination of the substantial number of responses available for study so that a reference to them may be included in this Committee's report to the United Nations in response to operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2604 B (XXIV). Technologically-improved international co-operation in the seismic field may prove highly desirable in providing the basis for a limited but substantial step forward in bridging the technical gaps in the adequate verification of a comprehensive test ban.

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

28. As we now consider what might be done to follow up the Secretary-General's questionnaire, I should like to stress that we in the Canadian delegation have no preconceived views or ideas on what conclusions may be drawn from the responses made so far by governments. At this stage we wish only to open what we hope may prove to be a useful dialogue in this Committee. Certainly we believe it is premature to take a position on the question of the establishment of any international body, with all the financial implications that might flow from such an action. For instance, we do not think it is by any means clear that an eventual seismic exchange system would involve a system of automatic and continuous circulation of data, as distinct from ad hoc arrangements, acceptable to governments.

29. We are justified in wondering, however, just how the adequacy of national verification procedures can be assessed by governments unless an undertaking is forthcoming concerning the willingness of governments, on a reciprocal and purely voluntary basis, to make seismic data available, and also without a further study of the seismological facilities which may be available in the world. We will, of course, consult other members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament -- particularly those countries that have capabilities in this field and have responded favourably -- about the best approach to a follow-up of the seismic information exchange questionnaire.

30. For our part, the chief Canadian Government seismologist, Dr. Kenneth Whitham, has undertaken to provide an initial examination of the available responses; and he hopes to put this into the form of a working paper for circulation to all delegations here around the beginning of August. Then, if the Committee were agreeable, that paper might be the starting-point for an informal meeting on 12 August at which Dr. Whitham would be present as well as, we hope, experts from other delegations. Also, if the idea of an informal meeting some time in mid-August meets with general approval, we think that besides Dr. Whitham's paper -- and together, of course, with any working papers that other delegations may wish to contribute -- it might be profitable to discuss certain specific and related questions. In this connexion I have taken the liberty of following the example of Mrs. Myrdal, representative of Sweden -- who I hope will shortly join us -- when, in the course of the informal meeting on chemical and biological weapons, she put forward a series of questions to facilitate discussion at such informal meetings.

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

31. Some tentative suggestions which arise in my mind as to the kind of questions which might usefully be examined in preparation for an informal meeting on international seismic co-operation include the following:

32. First, to what extent do the replies to the questionnaire supplement or modify existing scientific information concerning facilities for detecting and identifying underground nuclear-weapon tests?

33. Second, is it possible to estimate from the information provided about national seismic facilities the extent to which the identification capabilities for underground nuclear explosions may be improved through guaranteed international access to additional seismological data?

34. Third, have the results of the questionnaire identified any sectors of the globe or geographic areas for which the levels of nuclear explosion identification are perceptibly higher or lower than average? Would these areas be of vital significance in the enforcement of any comprehensive test ban?

35. Fourth, could the response of governments to the Secretary-General's questionnaire help such governments to identify methods for improving the effectiveness of their own seismic detection techniques, or would any further information be required for this purpose?

36. Fifth, is further examination warranted into the concept of international exchange of seismic data, as well as into the quantity and quality of data that may be made available from national means of identification?

37. Sixth, do the results of this survey warrant further consultation in the near future among nations ready to contribute to an examination of facilities for identification of nuclear explosions by seismological means, and to an examination of the most effective attainable measures to supplement the partial test ban of 1963?

38. Seventh, is it possible yet to establish the degree to which national verification procedures may be adequate, with or without an international exchange of seismic data, and the degree to which a prohibition of underground nuclear tests could be effective on either basis?

39. In view of the comparatively short time which I understand is to be available to us for our discussions at this summer session, I thought it would be useful to go into some detail, even at this stage, so that all delegations might have an equal opportunity to study these suggestions when considering how this Committee should respond in its report this year to the resolutions of the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, more particularly to resolution 2604 B.

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

40. In conclusion, as we are all only too well aware, this Committee has to be prepared to meet its critics at the next session of the General Assembly, which coincides with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. If we are to rise to that occasion, we must at least be seen to be tackling the problem of human survival in the nuclear age with the wisdom, patience, perseverance and objectivity which is expected of us.

41. Mr. EDELSTAM (Sweden): My intervention today will be devoted to the draft sea-bed treaty (CCD/269/Rev.2). At the outset, I wish to join those colleagues who have expressed their satisfaction at the fact that the co-Chairmen were able to present jointly to the Committee on 23 April a revised draft of the treaty on — to use the full title — the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

42. We have duly observed the important changes which have been made in the text as compared with that presented by the two delegations on 30 October of last year (CCD/269/Rev.1). We find it particularly important to note the incorporation, almost word for word, of the changes and amendments to articles I and II put forward by the Argentine delegation during the deliberations last autumn in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (A/C.1/997), as well as of substantial parts of the text suggested by Canada as regards article III (CCD/270). The Swedish delegation has all along strongly supported the efforts of the Canadian delegation to work out language for the verification provisions which could enhance the possibilities of making the treaty more generally acceptable.

43. Before going any further in my analysis of the new text, I should like to dwell for a moment on the general framework in which this draft treaty should, in our opinion, be judged. It would seem to us that there are two basic considerations: first, that of disarmament, and secondly that of ensuring the sea-bed as the common heritage of mankind. The latter aspect is admittedly being dealt with in another forum; but we cannot and should not isolate our considerations from the debate which has been taking place on this subject in the special sea-bed Committee of the United Nations.

44. Dealing first with the disarmament aspect, we register with satisfaction that the successful completion of this treaty will lead to the creation of an immense area

(Mr. Edelstam, Sweden)

of the world where nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction will be prohibited. We have to keep in mind, however, that the prohibition refers only to the bed of the sea and the floor of the oceans and not to the militarily much more important areas of waters above the bottom of the sea. The effect of this treaty will therefore, from the arms-control point of view, be a limited one.

45. Furthermore, the agreement in effect leads only to denuclearization of the sea-bed, not to the demilitarization which has all along been the goal of the vast majority of States. That is the main reason why many delegations have come to attach such importance to the insertion in the present treaty of a pledge obliging the parties to continue negotiations towards reaching further prohibitions on the sea-bed. There is admittedly a reference in the preamble to continued negotiations leading to the exclusion of the sea-bed and the ocean floor from the arms race. There is, further, the provision in article VI that a conference will be held five years after the entry into force of the treaty to review its operation "with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized."

46. As is well known, the Swedish delegation suggested last autumn, both in this Committee and in the United Nations, a somewhat more far-reaching formula by way of a new article in which the parties would pledge themselves --

> "... to continue negotiations in good faith on further measures relating to a more comprehensive prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof." (CCD/271).

The wording was based largely on the similar provision regarding further negotiations to curb the nuclear arms race which was inserted in the text of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) during the negotiations on that subject on the insistence of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

47. We regret that for the second time the Soviet Union and the United States delegations, when reviewing their draft treaty text, have not seen fit to accept that formula. We urge them once again to study this matter further. I think that such a more far-reaching pledge regarding further negotiations would considerably increase the value of the treaty in the opinion of many States. One of the reasons for this is of course the fate which a similar preambular pledge in an earlier arms-control measure has had. I am referring to the paragraph in the preamble to the partial

(Mr. Edelstam, Sweden)

test-ban Treaty in which the parties expressed their determination "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end ..." (ENDC/100/Rev.1)

48. The Polish delegation -- your delegation, Mr. Chairman -- in its intervention on 18 June made the suggestion that this Committee should --

> "... keep on its agenda the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor as formulated in the 1968 report to the General Assembly, when a programme of work (ENDC/236, p. 3) for this Committee was established after the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty. In that way members of the Committee may raise the question of further steps leading to the demilitarization of this important area whenever they see that a question is ripe for discussion, without waiting for the review conference as provided for in article VI of the draft before us. In this particular case we believe that what are generally called 'conventional' armaments can be dealt with in a separate document." (CCD/PV.471, para. 9)

I have quoted from your statement, Mr. Chairman, at some length because I want to express the support of my delegation for your suggestions. They should be regarded, however, not as a substitute for a further strengthening of the pledges in the treaty text regarding further negotiations, but as additions.

49. Turning now to the other main principle, that of securing the sea-bed as the common heritage of mankind: we know, as I have said earlier, that this is an issue being dealt with elsewhere. Efforts are being made to reach agreement on the establishment of an international regime for the sea-bed, leading eventually to some form of international administrative machinery to ensure that the further exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed and the ocean floor will be carried out in a way which furthers the interests of all States and rests on the principle I have just mentioned.

50. From the outset of the negotiations in our Committee on the subject of the sea-bed treaty a link has been suggested between such possible future international machinery and the verification provisions of the treaty. Already in the spring of last year the non-aligned members of what was then the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament proposed that, when it became feasible, verification could be carried out not only by the individual parties but also through an appropriate international agency or arrangement. In the suggestions as to verification provisions which were put forward last year by the Canadian delegation and which were supported by a

(Mr. Edelstam, Sweden)

vast number of other delegations, the possibility was mentioned of verification being carried out with the full or partial assistance of any State party, this assistance being sought either directly or indirectly "through appropriate international procedures including the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations." (A/C.1/992) As my delegation interpreted that provision it was a way of saying, although admittedly very indirectly, that if and when international machinery for the sea-bed was set up it might be possible for States desirous of so doing to make use of that machinery for their verification needs in relation to the treaty we are now discussing.

51. In the draft text before us, which in other respects closely reflects the content of the Canadian proposals, these references to international good offices, including those of the Secretary-General, have been omitted. In view of the importance attached to the above-mentioned principle that the sea-bed represents a common heritage of mankind, and the link between that principle and the notion of an international regime for the sea-bed, we must regard the failure to make any mention at all in the new text of the possibility of international control as a serious weakness. I think there is ground for saying that many other States which have taken an active part in the discussions on preserving the sea-bed exclusively for peaceful purposes, and on obtaining general recognition of the common interests of mankind in that area, will share this opinion. I would appeal to the co-Chairmen to review this matter once again in order to see if some reference cannot be incorporated in the treaty text reflecting the idea of international verification as a possible future development.

52. I wish to cover one further point. The new wording of article I, in its second paragraph, extends the prohibitory rules of the treaty to apply also within the sea-bed zone, but exempts the coastal State as well as the sea-bed beneath its territorial waters from that extension. In this way an ambiguity existing in earlier texts has been eliminated, an ambiguity in regard to cases where the territorial sea of the coastal State is less than twelve nautical miles.

53. An unclear situation remains, however, on one point. This refers to verification. We consider that a corresponding provision as to verification of the extended prohibition within the sea-bed zone is needed in order to avoid any conflict regarding

(Mr. Edelstam, Sweden)

the responsibility for fulfilment of the treaty obligations within the "gap" between territorial waters and the twelve-mile limit. The exemption of the coastal State from the prohibitions in article I should thus be matched by an exclusive right for the coastal State in relation to verification within that zone, irrespective of whether its territorial sea extends to twelve nautical miles or is less. The whole verification procedure consists of successive measures founded on the right of observation, laid down in the first paragraph. This right of observation applies, according to the paragraph, to activities beyond the sea-bed zone. Certainly observation is, however, also admitted under international law within the zone; but the verification procedure as to further measures within the zone is not regulated in the treaty. Such a deliberate "gap" in the provisions is, in our view, not desirable and could lead to unnecessary conflicts in a critical situation.

54. Clarification would be obtained if an additional paragraph were inserted in article III, preferably immediately after the present first paragraph, saying that the right arising under the first paragraph shall, with regard to activities of other parties within the sea-bed zone, accrue exclusively to the coastal State. Such a provision could, in our opinion, not be judged as an infringement of the principle of the freedoms of the high seas expressly referred to in the first paragraph of the same article. It could, on the other hand, have an impact on the security considerations of some coastal States.

55. None of the three main points I have dealt with in this intervention is new. They do not touch the basic concepts of the treaty and cannot in any way impair them. Their inclusion in a new and final draft would, on the contrary, I am sure, increase the possibilities of a speedy acceptance of the treaty by a vast majority of United Nations Members. I therefore express my sincere hope that other delegations, and particularly those of the Soviet Union and the United States, will study them closely in order to see if some suitable language may be found to enable them to be included. The Swedish delegation stands ready to participate actively in any such efforts.

56. Mr. HUSAIN (India): In company with those who have already done so, I should like to take this opportunity of welcoming amongst us our new colleagues, Ambassador Tanaka of Japan and Ambassador Petrov of Bulgaria.

(Mr. Husain, India)

57. I propose to speak today on the question of a treaty to prevent the arms race on the sea-bed. It will be recalled that the United Nations General Assembly, at its last session, carefully considered this question. In its resolution 2602 F (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 the General Assembly welcomed the submission of the revised United States-Soviet Union joint draft treaty of 30 October 1969 (CCD/269/Rev.1) along with "the various proposals and suggestions made in regard to the draft treaty" and called upon this Committee —

> "... to take into account all the proposals and suggestions that have been made at the present session of the General Assembly and to continue its work on this subject so that the text of a draft treaty can be submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration." (CCD/275)

58. The delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States, the two authors of the draft sea-bed treaty, submitted a revised version of their treaty text (CCD/269/Rev.2) on 23 April 1970, a week before the Conference adjourned for its mid-year recess, to enable this Committee in the resumed session to devote its serious attention to the new document, so that a text of a satisfactory and effective treaty which would enjoy the largest measure of support could be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its forthcoming twenty-fifth session.

59. In my statement at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York (A/C.1/1706, provisional, pp. 22 et seq.) I made several suggestions on behalf of my delegation for the improvement of the revised joint draft treaty. In the first place, I proposed that the first preambular paragraph of the draft treaty be amplified on the lines of United Nations General Assembly resolution 2467 A (XXIII), in order to make clear that the exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed must be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States, taking into account the special interests and needs of developing countries. Then, to ensure that the use of the sea-bed should be strictly for peaceful purposes, I suggested that the commitment

(Mr. Husain, India)

contained in the third preambular paragraph, regarding negotiations for a more comprehensive prohibition, be incorporated in the operative part of the treaty. Thirdly, I suggested that the sea-bed zone available to each coastal State, to which the prohibitions of the treaty would not apply and in which every coastal State would have full freedom of action, should be clearly defined by an unambiguous reference to a twelve-mile limit. Further, I proposed that the disclaimer clause contained in paragraph 2 of article II should be included independently as a separate article.

60. Finally, and the most important of all, I stated that the principle of some kind of international verification on the sea-bed was essentially sound and should be reflected in the treaty. In this connexion the Indian delegation agreed with the basic requirements suggested by the delegation of Canada for an acceptable article on verification, and generally supported the Canadian proposals contained in document A/C.1/992 for a draft article III. In the view of the Indian delegation, certain other elements of a verification system, proposed in the Brazilian working paper (A/C.1/993/Rev.1) also deserved careful and serious consideration.

61. It is a matter of satisfaction to the Indian delegation that two of its suggestions, which had the support of a very large number of delegations, have been accepted by the co-authors of the joint draft treaty in their new revised treaty text. Those suggestions relate to a straight-forward and clear-cut mention of the outer limit of the sea-bed zone envisaged in the treaty as being twelve miles, and the inclusion of the disclaimer clause in a separate and independent article in the treaty, so that it should become unequivocally clear that a treaty whose sole aim was to prevent the arms race on the sea-bed would not in any way prejudice or prejudge other questions relating to the law of the sea or their consideration later in an appropriate forum elsewhere.

62. The co-authors of the draft treaty have also accepted the suggestion made, among many others, by the delegation of India for the incorporation of the Canadian draft article III on verification, but have unfortunately omitted from

(Mr. Husain, India)

that formulation the important references to recourse by parties to the treaty to "the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations". The present draft text makes no provision for recourse to appropriate international procedures or good offices, including those of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

63. Speaking at our plenary meeting on 28 April, the representative of Canada stated:

> "Members of the Committee will recall that reference to those international procedures and good offices was made twice in our working paper A/C.1/992. The first reference, in paragraph 3, dealt with assistance in identifying the State responsible for activities giving rise to concern relating to compliance with the treaty. The second reference, found in paragraph 5, was concerned with access to assistance in carrying out verification procedures.
>
> "We would of course have preferred to see some reference in the draft treaty to appropriate international procedures to facilitate verification." (CCD/PV.468, paras. 8, 9)

With those views the representative of Italy agreed (ibid., para. 25). The representative of Canada has reiterated the Canadian position in his statement this morning.

64. The Canadian proposal regarding the possibility of recourse to the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General has been echoed by an overwhelming majority of coastal States which, being developing States, do not possess the technology and the resources to carry out verification by their own means with a view to ensuring that no activity would be carried out or any installation placed on the sea-bed near their coast which might endanger their security. In order that a sea-bed treaty may be widely acceptable; it is essential that this genuine and serious concern of the vast majority of coastal States in regard to their security should be satisfied. In our opinion, so far as continental shelves are concerned, other countries should not use them for military purposes.

65. There is another aspect of the issue of verification, namely that due regard should be had in the implementation of verification procedures to the sovereign rights of coastal States on their continental shelves. That very important aspect of verification also governs the thinking of a majority of coastal States, and has inspired the working paper on the provisions of article III of a sea-bed treaty proposed by the delegation of Brazil. Any verification system that might be established under the proposed sea-bed treaty should have due regard to the sovereign rights of a

(Mr. Husain, India)

coastal State on its continental shelf. The suggestions made by the delegation of Brazil for notification to and association of a coastal State in regard to verification procedures on its continental shelf merit serious consideration.

66. The delegation of India remains firmly of the view that certain basic considerations must be appropriately reflected in the proposed treaty on the sea-bed. The discussions which have taken place so far in our Committee, as well as in the United Nations General Assembly, have clearly revealed that most countries of the world would support the concept of the present draft treaty on the basis of the exploitation of the sea-bed for strictly peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind as a whole, taking into account the special interests and needs of the developing countries and the ultimate objective of the total and comprehensive demilitarization of the sea-bed being achieved by progressively increasing the scope of the prohibition of military activities on the sea-bed.

67. We agree with the suggestion made on 18 June by the Polish delegation that the question of the further demilitarization of the sea-bed should be kept on our agenda for continued negotiations (CCD/PV.471, para. 9); and we also agree with the representative of Sweden who has just spoken that the retention of this item on our agenda or its consideration at the periodic review conferences should not be regarded as a substitute for a commitment in the treaty text regarding further negotiations.

68. In conclusion, my delegation congratulates the Soviet and United States delegations on the constructive step which they have taken in the presentation of the second revised version of their draft sea-bed treaty, and expresses the hope that in the light of the views expressed, especially with regard to verification, and the concern voiced about continental shelves by my delegation and others, a final version of the draft text which would be widely acceptable will be prepared for consideration at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly.

69. Mr. SARAIVA GUERREIRO (Brazil): The Brazilian delegation would like to welcome Ambassador Tanaka of Japan and Ambassador Petrov of Bulgaria, who have taken over the leadership of their delegations in our Committee. I ask leave to add a special word of welcome to Ambassador Castañeda of Mexico, who has joined us for our summer session and whose competence and integrity I learned to appreciate many years ago.

70. All the countries represented here are quite aware of the importance of making progress in the field of disarmament, which lies at the very core of peaceful international relations. We are all quite aware, too, of the difficulties and

(Mr. Saraiva Guerreiro, Brazil)

complexities of the task entrusted to us. Without losing sight of our main goal, which is general and complete disarmament under effective international control, or of the overriding importance of stopping and reversing the nuclear arms race, we have been trying to advance in partial and collateral measures, even when those measures represent a step of no major significance to our final endeavours. In any case they contribute to the improvement of the general political climate and stimulate hopes and efforts towards more ambitious and far-reaching goals.

71. Within that context the Brazilian Government has tried to contribute, to the best of its ability, to firm and well-balanced progress in our negotiations. It is in that spirit that from the very beginning of our discussion of the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed we have given our most careful and detailed consideration to the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. This collateral measure is one of those fraught with many difficulties and complexities because, on the one hand, it runs the risk of affecting controversial questions of the law of the seas which are now in the process of debate and reconsideration, and on the other hand it raises, as all measures of disarmament usually do, the question of the proper role of international organizations in its adequate implementation.

72. Since we started our negotiations we have expressed our considered concern regarding a vital requisite for the completion of an effective treaty, namely that in order fully to attain its purposes the text of the treaty should avoid touching upon and prejudging unresolved questions of the law of the seas. We have always thought and still think that that can be done, and only in that way can the treaty fully achieve its purpose.

73. As long ago as 22 April 1969 my predecessor, Ambassador Frazão, stated:

> "Thus we believe that the question of the limits of applicability of this prohibition should be disentangled from the more complex question of ascertaining the limits of national sovereignty or jurisdiction." (ENDC/PV.405, para. 27)

74. That concern of the Brazilian Government was apparently shared by both our co-Chairmen when the last revised text (CCD/269/Rev.2) was introduced on 23 April last. Mr. Roshchin stated then:

> "In its previous statements, the Soviet delegation has repeatedly emphasized that the provisions of the sea-bed treaty, as is clear

(Mr. Saraiva Guerreiro, Brazil)

from the text, are solely designed to accomplish the purpose this treaty is intended to serve, namely, to prevent the extension to the sea-bed of the race with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This treaty is not intended to settle numerous issues of maritime law, to confirm or annul obligations assumed by States under other international agreements, or to anticipate any future solutions in this field." (CCD/PV.467, para. 21)

On the same lines, Mr. Leonard said: "One of our principal concerns in this treaty, of course, has been precisely to avoid affecting issues beyond the scope of arms control." (ibid., para. 40)

75. However, one cannot overlook the fact that the intention of both our co-Chairmen is not fully reflected in the second revised text which was presented to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on that same day. Indeed, it would seem clear that the new text favours some concepts of maritime law over others, notwithstanding the so-called disclaimer clause contained in article IV. We do not want to imply that no progress has been made in the revised draft by comparison with document CCD/269/Rev.1 presented on 30 October 1969. Indeed, in our statement on 28 April last (CCD/PV.468, para. 16) we acknowledged and praised the efforts made by the co-Chairmen as well as the improvements achieved in the text we now have before us. They still fall short, however, of meeting the basic consideration we have just stated.

76. Thus in article III, paragraph 1, the right to verify through "observation" is established in a manner that some countries might conceivably prefer to interpret as including not only the observation which is carried out in the course of normal navigation but also such observation as implies research and exploration of areas where the coastal State has some jurisdiction -- let us not discuss here the extent or nature of such jurisdiction -- as, for instance, on the continental shelf. In such areas, even if we put aside considerations of a legal nature, the least that can be said is that the coastal State has legitimate economic and security interests. That fact, indeed, is acknowledged, though in unsatisfactory language, in the second paragraph of article III, but then in relation only to inspection in loco. It is our conviction that, whenever observation implies research and exploration in such areas of interest to the coastal State, the right of the coastal State to be advised of and to participate in such activities should not be ignored.

(Mr. Saraiva Guerreiro, Brazil)

77. We should also bear in mind that the system of control that is now proposed to us relies mainly on the assumption of bona fides, especially from those who would exercise their rights based on paragraph 1 of article III. However, if we take into account the disparity of the technical means for purposes of verification at the disposal of the States parties, it is only fair that some other guarantee should be given to the coastal State besides the good intentions of the States exercising their unqualified rights of verification through observation. On this point the proposed system of control is even less understandable when we know that any violation of the treaty could be easily detected by normal means short of detailed research and exploration and not requiring any special activities of control. Therefore, when the need arises for detailed research and exploration of a specific area of interest to the coastal State, we fail to see why and how the participation of that State in such activities could have any detrimental implications for the effective implementation of the treaty.

78. The text before us makes no distinction in the matter of observation between areas of interest to the coastal State and areas where it has no particular and direct concern. On the contrary, it singles out in paragraph 1 of article III the freedoms of the high seas as applying without qualification to the whole geographical area of application of the treaty. In that sense the text takes a definite stand on a controversial issue which has no direct relation to the purposes of the treaty, and to a certain extent it does so in contradiction to article IV. If the intention of the co-sponsors is to avoid any innovation in the law of the seas, it seems that there is no need for including in paragraph 1 of article III a reference to freedom of the high seas, or perhaps no need for paragraph 1 of article III at all. Since this treaty is not meant to add to or detract from general international law, one may consider dealing with references to general principles either in the preamble or in a general clause of the same nature as article IV and perhaps even coupled with it.

79. Allow me to turn now to paragraph 2 of article III, in which the interests of the coastal State in control operations are to some extent taken care of, although in a manner which does not clearly define the specific rights which we deem to be essential.

(Mr. Saraiva Guerreiro, Brazil)

80. The expression "Parties in the region" seems to us to be too vague and liable to ambiguous interpretation in concrete cases. However, if that expression could serve the purpose of making the treaty more widely acceptable, one might live with it, since no one could deny that in that expression the coastal State is necessarily included in every instance. As the Brazilian delegation understands it, what is granted to the country in the region in paragraph 2 is, besides notification, not merely the possibility of participating but the right to participate in the act of control. The Brazilian delegation would appreciate confirmation of this understanding from the co-sponsors of the draft treaty, since the words "may participate", which appear in paragraph 2 of article III, might appear to justify in a concrete case the refusal of a request by the coastal State or any other country in the region. The ambiguity of the expression could theoretically bring about a situation in which a request by some countries is granted and that of others in the same region is denied, or in which a coastal State is not allowed to participate in the inspection while other countries, whose interest may be more remote, are admitted to participation in the act of control.

81. Although I am confident that the co-sponsors will clarify the point I have just raised, it seems evident that the questions would be dealt with more adequately if the present vague provision were replaced by a clear-cut recognition that countries in the region "shall be notified of and entitled to participate in such consultation".

82. It could also be argued that countries in the region should not be put on the same level as other parties to the treaty as far as participation is concerned; because the significance of the act of control and the degree of interest are certainly not the same for the coastal State, the countries in the region and all other parties to the treaty.

83. However, even if the final part of paragraph 2 of article III were improved along the lines we have just suggested, we still think that this new and improved provision not only should apply to the acts of inspection but should also cover the acts of control under paragraph 1 whenever verification goes beyond observation in the course of normal navigation and includes research and exploration of areas of interest to the coastal State or to countries in the region.

(Mr. Saraiva Guerreiro, Brazil)

84. At another point in article III, that is in paragraph 6, also we find a provision that seems to contradict the intention not to inject into this treaty the difficulties and controversies that beset the law of the seas. Indeed, the text as now drafted includes some qualification of the rights over the continental shelf, thus needlessly taking a stand on a controversy that goes beyond the scope of this treaty, in opposition to the practice and legislation of many countries. If we could envisage a provision without restrictive qualifications such as "the natural resources of", we might find neutral wording which, while acknowledging the rights of the coastal State, would not prejudge the nature and extent of those rights.

85. Finally, we think that the text could be improved if some omissions were remedied. One of these refers to the proper role of international organizations in the implementation of disarmament measures. In the case of this treaty we have always thought that, for instance, we could take advantage of the services of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for certain tasks that are quite compatible with his normal functions. In fact, in document A/C.1/993/Rev.1, submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations, we suggested that when a State party seeks the assistance of another State party to carry out an act of verification -- a matter regulated in paragraph 5 of article III -- it should be entitled to do so either directly or indirectly, among other things through the good offices of the Secretary-General.

86. The observations and suggestions which I have just submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on behalf of my Government are dictated by our firm purpose to co-operate towards the conclusion of a treaty on the non-armament of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. It is our unshakable belief that all efforts should be deployed in order to meet all interests and points of view which would not conflict with or detract from the purpose and effectiveness of the treaty. If we proceed in that way we can be certain that we are taking the only path that will ensure the widest possible support for this treaty.

87. Mr. BOZINOVIC (Yugoslavia): Before I begin my statement I should like to associate my delegation with the words of welcome addressed to the newly-appointed representatives of Bulgaria, Ambassador Petrov, and of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka,

(Mr. Bozinović, Yugoslavia)

and to wish them every success in their work in this Committee. I should like also to welcome back the representatives of Mongolia, Ambassador Erdembileg; Mexico, Ambassador Castañeda; Morocco, Ambassador El Fassi; and Argentina, Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas.

88. I should like to deal today with the question of the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. My delegation wishes, in fact, to offer some comments on the revised draft treaty submitted to this Committee by the Soviet Union and the United States on 23 April (CCD/269/Rev.2). I will proceed from the alterations contained in the second revision as compared with the first revision, and will then pass on to the observations and suggestions which have not been accepted by the co-sponsors of the draft treaty and which are consequently not reflected in the new proposal.

89. Changes in articles I and II are concerned with the definition of the limit of the zone to which the proposed treaty would apply. There has been a widely-supported request that the definition should be expressed in a direct manner and not indirectly by reference to another treaty. The new formulation of those two articles represents an improvement on that score.

90. Article III has certainly undergone significant changes. This article, as understood by the Yugoslav delegation, which has itself worked on it in co-operation with the Canadian and a number of other delegations, is of particular importance to non-nuclear-weapon coastal States, as well as from the viewpoint of the greater internationalization of the application of this treaty. Unfortunately, the co-sponsors of the draft treaty have not found it possible to accept the Canadian text as it was -- it had already been somewhat diluted in its last version -- but have omitted from it some essential elements.

91. In relation to article III, my delegation would be grateful if the co-authors would make it clear whether the word "verification" in paragraph 2 of article III means verification on the spot -- that is, whether it provides for access to the object of verification; and, if so, whether the sentence in the same paragraph reading --

> "Parties in the region of the activities, and any other Party so requesting, shall be notified of, and may participate in, such consultation and co-operation"

(Mr. Bozinović, Yugoslavia)

signifies that those countries may also participate in verification. We have raised this question since on a previous occasion we expressed the view that it was necessary to have "the right of consent and participation of States in verification on their continental shelf more clearly expressed" (A/C.1/PV.1707, p. 77). That is a quotation from my statement in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session.

92. The new article IV, which essentially replaces the former paragraph 2 of article II, seems to us to express more fully the view that this treaty must not regulate problems or prejudice solutions or the positions of countries on any issue other than that to which this treaty is relevant.

93. I would like now to touch upon those suggestions and requests which were made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations General Assembly during its last session but which have not been accepted by the co-authors of the draft treaty.

94. First, the request submitted by the Swedish delegation (A/C.1/994) — which is in fact the request of many countries, including Yugoslavia — has not been accepted. I should like to reiterate here that the position of the Yugoslav delegation has been and still is that we should exert efforts to achieve a comprehensive and possibly complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. If we are dealing today with but one part of this problem, that is only because some great Powers have not accepted the comprehensive approach. A fact which must also be recalled is that the full demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor is certainly much easier today when their militarization in the real sense of the word has not yet taken place. For that reason we wish once again to emphasize that the contents of the Swedish amendment to which I have referred are appropriate, and that it is necessary for us to assume a firm obligation that we will endeavour to solve the question of demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor in a comprehensive way.

95. In connexion with verification and possible inspection the Yugoslav delegation suggested on 4 September 1969 (CCD/PV.434, para. 98), and again at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations — and I quote from the latter statement:

(Mr. Bozinović, Yugoslavia)

"... parties to the treaty should undertake to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations -- with a view to notifying all signatories of the treaty -- of any noticed event or activity which might be contrary to the strict observance of the treaty, as well as of the results of verification if and when undertaken."
(A/C.1/PV.1707, p. 77)

That request is aimed at the further internationalization of the application of this multilateral treaty. But it solves at the same time another problem arising from the present article III, which states in paragraph 2:

"Parties in the region of the activities, and any other Party so requesting, shall be notified of, and may participate in, such consultation and co-operation."

96. The problem here is, how will the parties in the region know of such activities, and how will the parties to the treaty know that such activities are going on, and thus be able to express their desire to take part in consultation and co-operation? If the suggestion I have just mentioned is accepted, that might solve that difficulty, because every party to the treaty would be kept informed of such events and this would make the stipulation in the treaty applicable. Furthermore, the widely-supported request that applications for assistance in case of need to proceed to verification might be addressed also through the international community -- the Secretary-General of the United Nations or otherwise -- has not been accepted. We consider this to be a matter of principle, that it does concern the internationalization of the implementation of this treaty, and that the authors of the treaty should reconsider this question.

97. As regards international control and a possible international organ to carry out that function in connexion with this treaty, the view has been expressed that this is not necessary for the time being and that it would not be rational to set up an international organ in present conditions. In accepting that view, the Yugoslav delegation expressed the conviction that it was necessary to incorporate in the present treaty at least the idea of setting up such an international organ in the future. We still believe that that should be done.

(Mr. Bozinović, Yugoslavia)

98. Finally, proceeding from the aims of the treaty, it is our understanding that nothing in its provisions could be so interpreted as to prejudice the contents of a future international regime of the peaceful uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. But, if our understanding is not correct, it would be necessary to consider incorporating into the text a paragraph, or part of a paragraph, along the line suggested by the delegation of Mexico (A/C.1/995).

99. In concluding this brief statement I should like to express our appreciation to the co-sponsors of the draft treaty for submitting the revised draft, in which they have incorporated several suggestions for its improvement made by many countries in the United Nations General Assembly at its last session and also in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. If we now repeat some of our suggestions and positions, we do so in the conviction that they do not present in any way any exaggerated demands but present suggestions for certain corrections and amendments which we feel would contribute to making this draft treaty acceptable to the largest number of countries without changing its basic character and scope.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 473rd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Kazimierz Zybylski, representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Sweden, India, Brazil and Yugoslavia.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 30 June 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.